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I. 
.' 
TOWARD MODERNITY: A DEVELOPMENTAL TYPOLOGY OF 
POPULAR RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS IN JAPAN 
Introduction 
A. Synopsis of the typology developed in this study 
The purpose of this monograph is to establish a develop­
mental (some would say evolutionary) typology of popular reli­
gious affiliations in Japan. Intended for use by historians 
and sociologists of Japanese religions, the study relies upon 
the methods and insights of both disciplines. The scope of 
this paper is deliberately broad. This is not because I claim 
mastery of the entire range of Japanese religious history-­
today nobody can--but because typologies and overviews are, by 
their nature, ambitious and inclusive. Whatever merits this 
essay may have will lie in the perspective it provfdes and not 
in any exhaustiveness of detail. Entire books can, and have, 
been written--at least in Japanese--on nearly every facet 
touched upon. What I have done is join and elaborate various 
hints dropped by Japanese historians and sociologists regarding 
the development of religious institutions in their country with 
a conceptual framework derived primarily from the Westerh 
social sciences. This framework will be used, hopefully, not 
to mold history into any a priori schema, but to bring the 
development of religious affiliations in Japan into a compara­
tive setting. 
As far ranging as this paper is, it also has its limits. 
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I shall be concerned largely with the religious affiliations of 
the so-called common man. There are two reasons for this. In 
the first place, this will enable us to focus on the religious 
activities of the vast majority of the population--and typol­
ogies should aim at statistical relevance. In the second 
place, the popular or folk stratum deserves priority because of 
the pervasive influence of the Little Tradition in the religious 
life,of the country. One is even tempted to say that in Japan 
the Little Tradition is is the Great Tradition. Our attention 
will therefore be centered for the most part on religious 
associations at the grass-roots level and not upon their defini­
tion, regulation or beautification by governmental or sectarian 
authorities. I shall not be concerned with the organization 
of the monasteries or the clergy, important as these topics are. 
I shall not deal in any detail with the various religious 
schemes created and implanted "from above" such as the kokubunji 
of the Nara period or the ankokuji of Muromachi. It is my 
opinion that only after the development of modern communications 
media did these ideological concoctions become of direct and 
vital significance for the common man. Because I shall ap­
proach my subject from the vantage point of popular religion, 
the events and ideas of Japanese religious history which 
usually receive the greatest emphasis may appear slighted. 
Other things such as economic and demographic change which tend 
to be overlooked by historians of religion will take on greater 
importance. 
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Because the historical and sociological descriptions es­
sayed in this study are necessarily complex, I should like to 
state at once, and as simply as possible, the crux of the 
matter. In the following pages I shall describe 1) how lower 
classes of peasants become dissociated from traditional, 
patron-client type relationships both socially and religiously, 
2) how they gradually undermined the monopolistic affiliations 
which had been used to exclude and control them, 3) how more 
inclusive religious institutions and symbols helped to rein­
tegrate Japanese society on a broader, territorial basis, and 
4) how in the Modern Period, Japanese religion encouraged the 
activities of individuals and helped generate a new national 
identity. 
While history abhors stages, I can best tell this story 
by dividing it into three main sections.t1 Because these 
periods of religious history do not always correspond to the 
conventional divisions of Japanese history, I shall use capital 
letters whenever I refer to this typological periodization. 
I. The Ancient and Early Medieval Period (c. 600 to' 
c. 1400 A.D.) 
The rise of socio-religious monopolies; the establishment 
of syncretistic affiliations between local and adventi­
tious deities; Buddhism trickles down to the common 
people illegally in the Ancient Period; it is spread 
widely among them during the Early Medieval Period. 
II. The Late Medieval Period (c. 1400 to c. 1868 A. D. ) 
The rise of territorial Shinto parishes; the development 
of family temples and representational confraternities;· 
the Buddhism which was preached and propagated to the 
common people in previous centuries becomes institutional-· 
ized. 
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III. The Modern Period (c. 1868 to the present) 
The nation itself emerges as the holy community par 
excellence; the individual religious affiliations of 
"clients" and "devotees" rapidly expand. 
Closely related to these three stages are four dominant 
ideologies, i.e. networks of ideas, symbols and values providing 
motivation and sustenance for individual and social action and 
identity: 
I. The Ancient and Early Medieval Period 
An ideology of lineage. 
II. The Late Medieval Period 
The lineage ideology in a modified form becomes absorbed 
by smaller and more or less autonomous families; communi­
ties are reorganized along the lines of a territorial 
ideology; an ideology based on single meditational or 
devotional practices begins to take root as a result of 
the New Buddhism of the Kamakura period. 
III. The lineage ideology of ancient Japan is artificially 
revived by the state; an ideology of faith and commitment 
is developed by the so-called New Religions as the modern 
equivalent (in many ways) of the single practice ideolog­
ies of the Late Medieval Period. 
Caveat lector: The stubborn facts of history have a way 
of confounding typological schemes. Because each area of Japan 
underwent change at different times, it is hazardous to suggest, 
though I think we must, that changing religious affiliations 
can be dated at all. In nearly all cases, change was spear­
headed in the areas of most rapid economic development. In 
Ancient Japan, such changes were first felt in the parts of the 
country most exposed to the influence of the mainland. It was 
here that Buddhism was first introduced and patronized. In the 
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Late Medieval Period changes in religious affiliation took place 
first in those parts of the country where a money economy was 
spreading most rapidly. In Modern Japan, religious changes 
have taken place in the cities throughout the country, spread­
ing finally to all but the most remote island and mciuntain 
villages. As long as these discrepancies in time and space are 
borne in mind we can safely argue that the stages outlined above 
represent the general development of religious affiliations and 
ideologies in Japan. This typology therefore does not imply 
any unilinear evolution from monopolistic groups to territorial 
ones, or ones based on "faith alone." Furthermore, I do not 
wish to say that the clients and devotees of the Modern Period 
will have the last word in the annals of Japanese religious 
history. I merely hope to show that while families and indi� 
viduals of all periods of Japanese history have participated 
in a variety of religious affiliations, those indicated by 
these three stages were of the greatest significance, if not 
always quantitatively, at least as symptoms of overall social 
and economic change.2 
B.  A Method for Studying Religious Affiliations and 
Social Change 
Since the publication of Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges' 
La Cite Antique in 1'864, the importance of religious affilia­
tions as indices of social, economic and political change in 
all civilizations has become increasingly evident. In this 
now dated but still impressive masterpiece de Coulanges traces 
,, 
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the development of Graeco-Roman civilization through a series of 
stages: the gens, curia, tribe, city and finally, the Roman 
Empire itself. Each stage corresponds to specific religious 
conceptions, institutions and affiliations ranging from the 
hearth-gods of the ancient gens to the universal deities of the 
Empire. Behind this religious evolution de Coulanges discerned 
various social and political revolutions, from the revolt of 
the aristocrats against the ancient kings to the establishment 
of an aristocracy of wealth and achievement. In late antiquity 
these changes resulted in the secularization of politics and 
nature as well as the growth of scepticism and individualism. 
While religious and social identities had been.completely 
merged in the archaic period, de Coulanges shows that, thanks 
to these upheavals, ancient society experienced 1) the growth 
of more inclusive, or enfranchised communities, e.g. the emer­
gence of a territorial society out of the archaic gens, and 
2) the increase of what nowadays would be called socio-
cultural differentiation culminating in the spread of Chris­
tianity which, as de Coulanges puts it, "separates what all 
antiquity had confounded.n11 3 
After de Coulanges, the work of hisstudent Emile Durkheim 
on the evolution of society4 and of Max Weber on ascetic 
Protestant sects brought the study of religious affiliations 
into the maelstrom of modernization theory itself. While the 
religious dimension has been neglected by some students of 
modernization, others, especially those of the Weberian 
-11-
persuasion, have done important and impressive research in this 
area. Talcott Parsons, for example, has described the religious 
background of modern industrial society in an essay focusing 
largely on crucial turning points in the religious affiliations 
and values of western religion. He traces this history in 
terms of a chain of epochal separations, for example that of 
the religious community from its "ascriptive embeddedness" in 
ethnic and political identities, the individual from the 
church, and above all the conscience of the moral agent from 
the moral prescriptions imposed by religious and social bodies. 
The result of these crucial, historical disjunctions was then· 
emergence of what he regards as the "modern" elements in 
Western civilization: the voluntary principle of religious and 
moral affiliations, denominational pluralism, toleration, and 
the· extension of individual conscience and mutual trust. 5 The 
obverse side of this process is the reintegration of society 
at more inclusive levels of association. Hence the importance 
of the religious enfranchisements and the ecumenical value­
concensus which he sees developing in step with increasing 
participation in political systems. The integrating force of 
"Judeo-Christian ecumenism,n" he maintains, "brings religious 
affiliation into line with secular citizenship and freedom of 
opportunity in the secular world.n116 
Studies of this sort have opened up for us the whole 
problem of the relationship between religious affiliations and 
historical change. But the question remains, how shall we go 
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about our study? Poincare was probably right in his daring 
oversimplification: "la methode, c'est precisement le choix 
des faits.n" Yet surely there must be some guiding principles, 
some structural notions of social and cultural change that will 
help us "choose the facts.n" As we can see from our brief 
resume of the studies by de Coulanges and Parsons, a concept-­
if not the actual expression--which dominates much of the re­
search on religious and social change, ancient and modern, is 
socio-cultural differentiation, or as I should prefer to say, 
social and cultural differentiation. By this is meant the 
growth of specificity, complexity and interrelatedness in the 
functions and structures of society and culture� S. N. 
Eisenstadt defines differentiation as a description of "the 
ways through which the main social functions or the major insti­
tutional spheres of society become dissassociated from one 
another, attached to specialized collectivities and roles, and 
organized in relatively specific and autonomous symbolic and 
organizational frameworks within the confines of the same 
institutionalized system.117 This process takes place within 
society (e.g. among social roles and institutions) and within 
culture (e.g. the emergence of religious alternatives or 
"pluralism"). It also takes place between society and culture. 8 
Social realities become juxtaposed to religious, philosophical, 
or cultural ideas so that a synchronic development of "the 
Real" and "the Ideal" can no longer be presupposed. The 
religious community becomes disoriented from the state. An 
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unprecedented tension arises between the way things are and the 
way they ought_ to be. Karl Jaspers, for example, in his analy­
sis of the religious and cultural changes of the Axial Period 
(roughly 800 to 200 B. C. ) ,  finds that in societies from Greece 
to China 
man becomes conscious of Being as a whole, of himself 
and his limitations. He experiences the terror of 
the world and his own powerlessness. He asks radical 
questions. Face to face with the void he strives for 
liberation and redemption. By consciously recognizing 
his limits he sets himself the highest goals. He ex­
periences absoluteness in the depths of. selfhood and 
in the lucidity of transcendence. All this took place 
in reflection. Consciousness became once more con­
scious of itself, thinking became its own object. 
After this rather heady, philosophical description, he 
goes on to point out the difference this breakthrough made to 
society. 
Spiritual conflicts arose, accompanied by attempts to 
convince others through the communication of thoughts, 
reasons and experiences. The most contradictory pos­
sibilities were essayed. Discussion, the formation 
of parties and the division of the spiritual realm 
into opposites which nonetheless remained related to 
one another, created unrest and movement to the 
very brink of spiritual chaos. 9 
From the comparative point of view, Jaspers' discussion 
of the Axial Period is somewhat limited since he restricts 
himself to a description of the cultural fissions within the 
consciousness of elite classes. Nevertheless, what we have 
here is an analysis of an emerging, archaic pluralism which was 
of such a magnitude as to create disruptions (differentiations) 
within and between society and its inherited cultural templates. 
The distinctions between these three dimensions of 
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differentiation--that within society, within culture, and between 
the two--are of vital importance since changes in society and 
culture are not necessarily eurhythmic.n10 This is why I hesitate 
to use the expression "socio-cultural differentiation. "  Just 
as an economic system can become more complex than the social 
organization associated with it, a society may become more highly 
differentiated than its cultural blueprints. An example of 
this kind of dysrhythmic change is the totalitarianism imposed 
upon many of the technologically advanced societies of the 
. . u1 d. ing Japan. llhtwentiet century, inc 
If social and historical change were synonymous with dif­
ferentiation, the history of human societies would be reduced 
to a simple process of atomization. A theoretical counterbal­
ance is needed. De Coulanges in the study mentioned above 
repeatedly stresses the progressive enfranchisement of the 
newly liberated classes which previously had been excluded 
from the political and religious life of the ancient city. In 
the end, even the plebeian was allowed to participate in the 
municipal cult.n12 Durkheim himself was keen to point out that 
the division of labor results in a new level of interdependence 
and interaction within society, or what he called "organic 
solidarity.n" Somehow or other, society must assimilate and 
adjust to its own growing complexity. Parsons stresses this 
point when he writes, "differentiation processes also pose new 
problems fo . 13.integration. .. 
My decision to "choose the facts" on the basis of these 
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sociological concepts, differentiation and integration (or en­
franchisement), immediately calls to mind the host of difficul­
ties which surrounds the idea of modernization with which they 
are so intimately related . . While I deliberately will focus my 
attention on the role of religious affiliations as symptoms of 
the modernization of Japanese society, I hope to avoid, wherever 
possible, the more obvious excesses of "modernization theory" 
itself. Dean C. Tipps has rightly.pointed out that the diffi­
culty posed by the concept of modernization sterns from "its 
ability to evoke vague and generalized images which serve to 
summarize all the various transformations of social life atten­
dant upon the rise of industrialization and the nation-state 
in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 1114 The 
modernization theory, if it can be so designated or dignified, 
which I shall presuppose in this study is purposely of a low 
profile. This is so for two reasons. In the first place, it 
is my conviction that the less modernization implies theoreti­
cally, the more accurate our description of it is likely to be 
empirically. In the second place, while the concept of 
modernization generally implies the existence of some kind of 
syndrome of psychosocial and historical transformations, these 
clusters of changes with the "subsystems" of the social system 
cannot be easily predicted. Consequently, the idea of inter­
related, necessary change among the parts of society which the 
theory seems to promote must always be weak and hypothetical. 
This is not to deny the existence of any eurhythrnic or systemic 
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change, however. Far from it. I simply mean that such changes 
do not always take place as expected, and certainly do not al­
ways appear in the same way in all times and places. This I 
have already pointed out in the caveat lector above. I shall 
therefore use the word modernization to mean 1) the growth of 
social and economic differentiation and interdependence related 
to 2) a penumbra of secondary cultural changes. The relation­
ship between these primary and secondary characteristics may 
be that of concomitant change or even cause and effect. Whether 
the relationships between these primary and secondary changes 
are concomitant or causal, they are in no way universal, even 
if they do sometimes fall into systemic patterns. It should 
be obvious from these remarks that I do not see any Weltplan 
in the processes of modernization. I do not even assume that 
modernization is a good thing. I shall therefore use the con­
cept in a comparative way not in order to argue that Japan is 
either more or less "modern" than the West, but to compare 
the differences and similarities in the two cases measured in 
terms of the changing religious affiliations which have 
attended their movement toward modernity. 
II. The Ancient and Early Medieval Period 
A. The Lineage Ideology and Socio-Religious Monopolies
in Ancient Japan 
Various exclusive groups or cliques, prominent from the 
early historical period through the early Tokugawa shogunate, 
claimed exclusive control over both the sacred and secular 
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resources of society and may therefore be thought of as socio-
religious monopolies� Only recognized members of these groups 
could enjoy the privileges and bear the obligations of their 
common religious life. Even though they were not necessarily 
consanguineous these monopolistic groups based their control 
over society on an ideology of lineage. Their ancestral 
deities were, or so they claimed, the founder� of villages and 
clans. Others were culture heroes who had taught their descen­
dants various arts and crafts. While these monopolistic 
groups were closed and exclusive they were flexible enough to 
incorporate--through the fiction of kinship-�inferior classes 
and occupational groups. The latter were therefore semi­
enfranchised members of the community who were allowed to 
participate in the affairs and ceremonies of the group in minor 
ways. Examples of such religious and social cliques are the 
ujigami (clan-god) faith of the ancient lineage groups (uji) , 
the linked households (dozoku), UJ1gami shrines and ujidera 
(clan temples) of the warrior class, various occupational and 
artistic guilds (za) , and conservative parish guilds (miyaza) 
which controlled the affairs of Shinto parishes in the Capital 
Provinces. We should not forget that until the middle of the 
Heian period the court tried to exert a monopolistic control 
over Buddhism itself. Edicts from the eighth century--not to 
mention the soniryo (rules for priests and nuns in the ritsuryo 
code)--prohibited Buddhist priests from preaching to the common 
people.t15 The state itself controlled ordination to the priest­
hood. 
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We know of no cultures in a pure undifferentiated stage. 
In Japan, prehistorians claim to have isolated several cultural 
strata coexisting even before the rise of the Yamato federa­
tion.16 Nevertheless, there are indications that the level of 
differentiation both in culture and in society was compara­
tively low. Ritual (matsuri) was not clearly distinguished from 
. . 
) 171. . .po 1t1ca1 ad .m1n1strat1on (�atsur1-goto . There was a signifi-
cant lack of differentiation between the divine and human 
realms. Emperors, priests and shamans were seldom clearly 
distinguished from the gods or spirits they served. This is 
suggested by the etymology of the word kami itself which some 
scholars believe can be traced back to the Turco-Tartar qam, 
meaning not god but shaman. Perhaps more important was the 
fact that the ordinary Japanese became an ancestral deity 
after death. The "internal logic" of ancient shamanism, 
animism and ancestor worship therefore precluded any clear-cut 
distinctions between the human and the sacred worlds. 
In ancient Japan ancestral deities were simultaneously 
gods of agriculture, water or mountains .. The gods of kin and 
community were virtually indistinguishable from the gods of 
nature. Through nature they brought both bane and blessings 
upon the community. In the Kojiki's Age of the Gods about 190 
deities are named, but only 20 of their names appear more than 
once in the text. Gods :with specific functions or "personali­
ties" therefore seem to be few in number. The okami of this 
period seem to be undifferentiated high gods which become 
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functionally specialized and schematized only as a result of 
ideological contrivance or political policy.t18 
As early as the Kofun period (c. 250-600 A. D. ) ,  some 
degree of social stratification was taking place in Japan. 
After the rise of the archaic Yamato state, a basic social 
dichotomy can be seen between the local folk (tami) on the one 
hand and the supra-local or intra-clan sphere of the elite 
(oyake) on the other. Our earliest documentary evidence for 
the ancient clan system dates from.the seventh century. To 
infer from this material the conditions of Japanese society 
in previous centuries is risky indeed. Already the.clan system 
(ujikabane kokka) was in the process of being absorbed by a 
bureaucratic state (ritsuryo kokka) based on Chinese models. 
Our earliest documents therefore describe a clan system already 
in decline. The uji itself, far from being a simple exogamous 
clan, was a territorial group whose relative status was defined 
in terms of relationships with the Yamato court. Actual con­
sanguinity may have played a role in the social solidarity of 
the upper strata of these groups (the ujibito, or "clansmen") . 
These kinship ties were extended fictitiously to include occu­
pational corporations (be or tomo) , other clients (ujiko) and 
slaves (yatsuko) under the control and protection of the 
ujibito. The clan itself--! shall use this traditional trans­
lation of the word uji--was therefore a closed but expansible 
organization. Whatever their nature in the earlier period, by 
the eighth and ninth centuries the clan- gods (ujigami) were 
-20-
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beginning to be regarded as ancestral deities. The ideology 
of the Yamato court--the dominant clan--was likewise based on 
the fictitious notion that its ancestors were the gods who 
created Japan and established the state. The preface to the 
Kojiki tells us that this lineage ideology "is the framework 
of the state, the great foundation of the imperial influence.11e20 
Both at the local level of the folk and at the intra-clan level, 
the primary symbol of hierarchy and political integration was 
this ujigami. When clan migrations occurred, these gods were 
merely "split" (bunrei)--a theological operation suggesting 
the "segmentation" of groups at the level of society described 
by Durkheim as "mechanical solidarity.11 21 
During this period the heads of the clans (uji-no-kami) 
also served as clan priests. Beginning with the seventh cen­
tury these provincial strongmen were lured to the Yamato 
capital and transformed into a civil nobility (kuge), Japan's 
first aristocrats. Nevertheless, in the fourth and eleventh 
months of the year they continued to take leave of the court to 
return home and preside over the rituals of their ujigami. 
The religious life of these local communities, which, following 
Chiba Masaji, I shall call the "festival faith,e" has proved to 
be remarkably long lived. Many conservative villages on re­
mote islands or in mountainous areas display some of the same 
features today. This festival faith was, and is, characterized 
by 1) an emphasis on festivals and religious activity rather 
than on scriptures, sects and doctrines, 2) a continuity between 
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the social, political and sacred worlds, 3) a sense of religious 
identity, obligation and privilege based on groups rather than 
individuals, 4) a close connection between festivals, social 
controls and sanctions, and 5) --as long as the local community 
remains intact--a strong resistance to the introduction of gods 
or religious practices that would rival the indigenous ujigami. 
While in folk Shinto the professional priest is a rela­
tively recent phenomenon, in the larger shrines supported by 
the court and aristocracy religious professionals appeared 
early in history.t22  Emperors began to delegate some of their 
religious responsibilities and clans like the Imbe and Nakatomi 
assumed the role of religious specialists. Ujibito such as the 
Arakida, Watarai and Negi families at Ise began serving ujigami 
not regarded as their own ancestors. Because the ujigami en­
shrined at Ise was the ancestress of the imperial family, these 
ujibito worshipped their own clan deities at separate shrines 
within the precincts. Likewise the Kamo family which served as 
ujibito at the shrine bearing its name north of Kyoto, did not 
regard this deity as its own ancestor. Professional priesthoods 
of this sort continued to develop as land and buildings were 
donated to the shrines. 
B. Warriors in the Early Medieval Period 
During the Heian and Kamakura periods, the ruling elite 
became more openly differentiated into aristocrats and warriors. 
While the court turned to Exoteric and Esoteric Buddhism, the 
solidarity of warrior clans continued to rest upon their dozoku 
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and ujigami. Thier patriarchal lineage ideology was to persist 
for centuries, even after the rise of warrior groups organized 
along the lines of a territorial society with tutelary 
deities. During the Kamakura period, warrior families began to 
build clan temples (ujidera) in imitation of those raised by 
aristocrats during the Heian period. Erected by and for these 
specific family lineages, the ujidera was a private institution. 
Some of them were established when the warrior himself took 
holy orders. Without retiring to a temple, these ordained 
warriors built chapels in their own residences. In other cases, 
their widows were ordained and, again without going into seclu­
sion, built chapels for the repose of their husbands' souls. 
Most ujidera were therefore built without anyone's retiring 
from the world and were devoted to the long life of the warrior 
in this world and the salvation of his family in the next. 
In short, there was virtually no difference between the war­
rior'ns clan-Buddha (ujibutsu) and his Shinto ujigami. The 
fact that these temples appear in greatest numbers around the 
fourteenth century when the lineage ideology was coming under 
attack by a more complex society indicates that their purpose 
may have been to shore up this dozoku symbol of the warrior 
class. Throughout their history these temples shared the tur­
bulent ups and downs of their masters. After the defeat of a 
clan, the temple was either deserted or taken over by the new 
feudal lord. As time went on commoners took over many of these 
warrior temples, turning them into village temples (sonji) or 
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local Buddha halls (butsudo)t. Many of them would later play 
important roles in the ikko ikki rebellions.t2 3  In a similar 
way, when temples in Kyoto began to fall prey to fire and earth­
quake, merchants and artisans stepped in to rebuild and support 
them since the temples' aristocratic patrons were no longer 
able to bear these financial burdens. Many of these temples 
(called machido) in the merchants' quarters were converted into 
chapels (dojo) of pietistical movements such as Ippen's Ji sect. 
More notable however was the growth of the Lotus sect among 
these urban commercial classes. 
C. Occupational Monopolies and Magic 
Early occupational groups were also based on a lineage 
ideology. Mirror makers, jewelers, potters, brewers and others 
worshipped ancestral gods who, they believed, had founded their 
families and taught them their skills. These occupations were, 
in effect, monopolized by specific clans thought to possess a 
unique magical consciousness and mystique for their work. In 
Japan as elsewhere "magic protected techniques; behind magic 
they were able to make progress. 11t24 Under the influence of. . 
immigrations from the mainland from about 270 to 500 A.D. occu­
pations became more diversified. Because of the generally 
undifferentiated state of the economy monopolistic organiza­
tions were still necessary to accumulate capital and transmit 
skills. Gradually, however, artisans and artists began to turn 
to the court, to the aristocracy and to large temples and 
shrines for protection. Eventually the magical power of the 
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ancient artisan over his craft evolved into the mystique of the 
hereditary craftsman which can be seen in some of the tradi­
tional arts of Japan to this day. It is important to bear in 
mind that in earlier days a more magical version of this mysti­
que served to perpetuate an economic monopoly over these crafts 
25and trades.e
D. The Early Medieval Miyaza 
The guilds of artisans and tradesmen which grew up in the 
shadows of medieval temples and shrines were often indistin­
guishable from the religious cliques (miyaza) which arose in 
Shinto parishes. The economic and the religious guilds (both 
called za) were monopolies which developed in the Capital Prov­
inces at approximately the same time, the late Heian period. 
The names and functions of these groups were often identical. 
Only gradually did they become differentiated into religious, 
artisan, commercial and artistic guilds. 
The miyaza came into existence between the time of the 
decline of the ancient clan system and the spread of the 
medieval manor (sheen)e. Appearing primarily in areas of rapid 
economic growth and unstable class relations, the miyaza, like 
the commercial za, was a defensive institution. By claiming -
that their ancestors were contemporaries of the ujigami who 
had founded the community, the local establishment was able to 
assert its control over the Shinto shrine, irrigation, rights 
to common land and client families. In those parish guilds 
which developed in manors, the ranking leadership of the manor 
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served as leaders of the miyaza and as the priestly celebrants 
and oblationers of its shrines. Only those established families 
said to possess "stock" (kabu) were allowed to participate in 
the activities of these guilds (kabuza)t. A hierarchy was there­
by established between members and non-members while a system 
of hereditary ranks developed within the miyaza itself.t26 
III. The Establishment of Syncretistic Affiliations 
A. The Growth of Multiplex Religious Affiliations 
In spite of its conservative, monopolistic tendencies, 
the ujigami faith was complemented since earliest times by 
various other religious affiliations. After the capital was 
-
moved to Heian-kyo, the ujigami faith of the aristocrats became 
more complex. Clansmen began to worship the ujigami of other 
clans. At the Hirano shrine built by imperial command in the 
western suburbs of the capital as many as eight different clans 
worshipped one ujigami. As the great para-imperial families 
such as the Fujiwara expanded, branch shrines of their ujigami 
were established throughout the country.t27 � While branch shrines 
bearing the name of a parent deity are quite rare in the 
Engishiki (A.D. 9 27), their number increased greatly during the 
middle ages. The importance of the growth of these shrines 
lies in the fact that they were, in some sense; "alternatives" 
to enchorial ujigami cults. Big-name shrines such as Ise, 
Inari, Yasaka, Kasuga, Hiyoshi, and Hachiman succeeded in over­
coming the resistance of local religious establishments and 
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settled down with, or actually absorbed, the indigenous deities 
o f  the village. 
In the Kamakura period warrior families sometimes moved 
about the country in order to take up new responsibilities. To 
legitimate their new power base, territorial deities (chinjugam� 
were set up. Gods already well established in the region were 
generally designated as the deity o f  the estate and as the new 
lorde' s  own ujigami. Sometimes a god related to the Hachiman 
deity of the Minamoto was brought to the region and enshrined. 
If the estate were owned by a large Buddhist temple, the tute­
lary Shinto deity o f  the main temple (e.g. Hiei ' s  Hiyoshi 
Shrine or Kofukuji ' s  Kasuga Shrine) was installed. In other 
cases, the founder o f  the new line might be enshrined, or al­
ternatively the original clan deity was simply "split" and 
taken to the new estate. 
In spite o f  the prestige o f  the official chinjugami of 
the estate, veneration o f  the local deities continued. It was 
the custom for a new warrior chieeftain to make the rounds of 
his estate and worship at local village shrines. Often, how­
ever, the gods were brought to the provincial capital where he 
could worship them with less trouble. This gave rise to a new 
kind of shrine, the "general shrine" (sosha) or the rokusho no 
miyae, a shrine in which the warrior chieftain venerated the 
six most important deities o f  the estate. Such shrines were 
not, strictly speaking, ujigami , nor did they have a parish 
(ujiko) associated with them. Villagers, who were generally 
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oblivious to the ideological intent of these shrines , made use 
o f  them as they did any other place of worship: to insure 
plentiful harvests and the well-being of the local community. 
(Even amulets from the Grand Shrine of Ise were put out in the 
fields to act as scarecrows and fertility charms . )  Nevertheless, 
the prestige associated with these official shrines and the 
religious practices o f  the warrior class persist to the present 
day in the customs, terminology, processions and institutions 
of village shrines.t28 
B. Functional or Specialized Deities 
From earliest times, the ujigami cult was complemented 
by faith in specific or functional deities. As was mentioned 
above, there were only a few such deities in the Kojiki. The 
most important stimulus behind the differentiation among the 
Shinto deities was the introduction of Buddhism in the sixth 
century. While early Japanese Buddhists could scarcely tell 
one Buddha from another, Buddhist iconography soon began to 
display a capacity for making critical and orthodox distinctions. 
Under the influence of this art, statues o f  the Shinto kami 
were also made, indicating a clearer individuation among the 
gods . Served by Buddhist priests and rituals , flattered with 
such exotic titles as "Buddha" and "Bodhisattvat" the kami 
. , 
responded by becoming more "functional and personal. 11t2 9  Many 
of these specialized deities seem to have evolved out of the 
ujigami of specific clans. 30 Significantly , most of these 
functional deities made their first appearance in and around 
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the capital where the most highly developed culture and economy 
were to be found. In the more distant provinces there was no 
comparable growth of functtional deities.t31  I t  was probably in 
the cults of these functional deities around the capital (e.g. 
the Gion festival of the Yasaka shrine) that Japanese festivals 
were transformed into spectacles and began to be "secularized.t" 
As Chiba Masaji puts itt, external ceremony or festivities 
(sairei) became "differenttiated from" the rituals .of the festi­
vals (saishiki) .t32 
C. Holy Men and Adventitious Deities 
Together with these functional deities there evolved a 
new type of religious leadership and a new mode of religious 
affiliation. Under the ancient ritsuryo system, priests who 
ideally had deserted the world to live in seclusion were actual­
ly state servants. Even during_ the Nara period many monks 
illegally left their temples for private retreats in the moun­
tains. There they planted the seeds of popular Buddhism which 
would sprout with figures such as Kuya (903-972) and Ryonin 
(1072-1132) and finally come to bloom in the new Buddhism of 
the Kamakura period. The wandering holy men of the middle 
ages (hij iri, yamabushi, oshi, and shugenja) escaped the tute­
lage of the state by forgoing ordination. Religious "alterna­
tives" from the outside world were transmitted to the closed 
society of manor and village primarily by these unordained 
priests of the common folk. Together with wandering enterttainers 
and craftsmen they gathered at large shrines and temples which 
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were associated with the legends of famous saints of  the past 
such as Kukai, En no gyoj a, or Shotoku Taishi . They also con­
gregated in market places which, compared with life on the 
manors, were relatively unrestricted . These were places where 
itinerant holy men and artisans could peddle their waresa- ­
sacred and seculara- -with comparative freedoma. During the Heian 
period a number of  the pilgrimage routes of the hijiri came 
under the control of the Shingon and Tendai sects . .  
The popular holy man of the middle ages carried with him 
a mixed bag of religious goods - -Taoist magic and Buddhist and 
Shinto spells and practices. Some preached a single practice 
such as the nembutsu . Relying on their own charisma rather 
than ordination , they organized their followers in small con ­
fraternities (ko) and cultic orders . 33 As emissaries of func­
tional deities , the hijiri were expected to have some kind of 
special knowledge about the spiritual world. Since Shintoa· 
itself was lacking in such speculation , the growth of these 
professionals increased the role played by Buddhism, Confucian­
ism and Taoistic speculation in folk religion. Thanks to them, 
knowledge of the high culture of  the capital and its temples 
filtered down to the provincesa. This religious lore was also 
appropriated and promoted by dominant provincial classes as a 
way of  demonstrating their own unique status.a34 
Even today outsiders sometimes are credited with magical 
powersa. In Fukuoka Prefecture in the fishing village of Ito­
shima, there are women who trade the products of their village 
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for the cereals produced in the neighboring farming villages. 
These cereals are called the "first-fruits" (hatsuho) and can­
not be eaten by the farmers before the trading takes place. 
Furthermore, if  the ladies do not like the entertainment pro­
vided by the farmers, they may turn their baskets upside down, 
beat on them as though they were drumse, and return to the vil­
lage in a huff. It is believed that when this happens the 
35households of the farmers who had displeased them will die out. 
Since the deities and Buddhas of the hijiri came to the 
local community from the outside world and provided some kind 
of "alternative" to the indigenous cult, we shall refer to them 
as adventitious deities (marodogami)e. The attraction of the 
adventitious deities was both thaumaturgical and soteriological. 
As functional deities they had special miraculous virtues 
(reigen) such as the ability ·to ensure safe childbirth, a good 
harvest , or the cure o f  various maladies. Others made possible 
instant enlightenment--or at least assured believers o f  rebirth 
in the Pure Land after death. In the eyes of the villager, the 
deity and his messenger were not always clearly distinguished. 
The missionarye' s  residence sometimes evolved into the shrine 
of the marodogami. In other cases, villagers themselves sought 
out an adventeitious deity and enshrined it in the precints of 
their own ujigami. By giving their heretofore nameless deity 
the name of a prestigious provincial or national god they 
sought to insure the continued welle-being of the local cult 
while enhancing the good name of the village itself. 
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Two types of religious affiliation emerged from thist: the 
one based on the local deity, the other on faith in a deity from 
the world outside the community. These alternatives can be 
summarized as follows.t36 
LOCAL PATTERN ADVENTITIOUS PATTERN 
(uj igami) (marodogami) 
integrates community and establishes a community.tof be­
kin lievers apart from the natural 
community and kinship groups 
exclusive inclusive, missionary faith 
undifferentiated func­ strong personality and particular 
tions functions 
"particularistic" rela­ a relation between the sacred and 
tions with its own clan man based on faith. (This is es­
or kin based on genealogy pecially true of confraternities 
and/or geography of the Kamakura Buddhist sects 
based on a "single practice. ") 
authority of deity re­ authority of deity reflected in 
flected in political, the magico-religious power of its 
economic, social and cul­ transmitter (missionary, shaman, 
tural circumstances of hero), his techniques of ecstasy, 
adherents and his socio-political and eco­
nomic situation 
(generally) routinized (often) a charismatic leadership
leadership based on a developing later into hereditary 
rotating lay-priesthood priesthoods 
D. Confraternities and the Spread of Adventitious Deities 
The confraternities which played such an important role 
in the spread of the adventitious deities and Buddhas have a 
pedigree going back to Shotoku Taishi. Shotoku is �lleged to 
have instituted special meetings (e) for the study of various 
Buddhist .sutras. Actually the purpose of these lectures was 
often of a magical nature. They were believed to enhance the 
- -
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power and wealth of the nation, insure health of the emperor 
or other patrons, and to ward off natural disasters and plagues. 
Gradually the purpose of thesee� changed from protecting the 
natiori to bringing happiness in the hereafter to ancestral 
souls, and therefore came to be held on the anniversary of their 
death-day. Commoners were not allowed to participate in these 
assemblies until after the Heian period.37 These early confra� 
ternities reached a decisive turning point with the spread of 
the New Buddhism of the Kamakura period, the Zen, Nichiren, and 
the Pure Land sects. The Ikko sect, for example, began to hold 
ho-on-ko on Shinrane' s  death-day to give thanks for the bles-
sings of the founder and to strengthen the bonds of fellowship. 
In confraternities of this sort faith and religious "volun­
tarism" took on a new importance. The result was the emergence 
of a type of religious affeiliation which had at least the 
potential for transcending the bonds of kin and local community.38 
The processes whereby confraternities of an adventiteious 
deity become established in villages gives us some idea of the 
ways in which external cults were indigenized in general. Often 
the confraternity had a dual leadership made up of missionaeries 
from the outside and stalwarts of the cult within the community. 
The new cult was propagated most successfully when the missionary 
was able to befriend the local establishment and the priest of 
the Shinto shrine. In new villages or in villages where the 
cooperateive spirit of the community had weakened, the new faith 
made rapid headway. Often the adventitious god was actuallye. 
. . \' 
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amalgamated with the indigenous deity. When this happened, the 
local deity acquired a name, a set of specific functions and a 
more definite "personality.a" This process of acculturation was 
hastened when the village was located close to the main shrine 
of the outside deity. In the Capital Provinces, for example, 
many village deities were �alled Ise-sama, whereas in distant 
Hokkaido missionaries from Ise were able to establish only 
branch shrines of their cult. Often the temporary residence 
of the missionary serv�d as an ersatz pilgrimage site for those 
unable to make the long journey to Ise. Aside from sheer dis­
tance, the process of assimilation was also slowed down by the 
degree of strangeness of the new deity . The more the cult of 
the marodogami resembled that of the ujigami, the more readily 
it was accepted by the community. For example, the Ise faith, 
which resonated deeply with the uj igami faith , was absorbed 
more rapidly than the ho-on-ko of Pure Land Buddhism. Once 
accepted by a village, the confraternity became integrated into 
the structure of the local cult by patterning its festivals and 
religious concepts after those already familiar in the village , 
and by gradually substituting for its own discipline the dis­
tribution of wonder- working amulets throughout the village. 
As in other religious traditions, magic was a more effective 
evangelistic technique than discipline . a39 
E. Syncretism as "Centripetal Differentiation" 
Such were the logistics of acculturation .  But the question 
remains : why did this result in syncretism and not pluralism? 
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Part of the answer to this question lies in the high value 
placed on consensus in agrarian societies based on intensive, 
cooperative labor. Once the marodogami entered the village, 
attitude.s of "hospitality1 1 40 and harmony undoubtedly helped to 
dampen religious and social conflict. But the ultimate reason 
for the emergence of syncretism lay in the dependency of the 
traditional village. While its ethos and attitude were exclu­
sive and particularistic, the local community was both vulner­
able to outside attack and dependent upon the outside world for 
protection. While it had its own internal political culture 
and leadership, ultimate power and authority came from outside. 
It is therefore not surprising that the mythical charter of 
Japanese sacred kingship itself, the tenson-korin myth, was 
based on a shamanistic or marodogami kind of scenario.e4 1  Such 
myths seem to indicate that 
supernatural powers and superior culture usually 
came from the outside to the exclusive in-group 
society. . . e. The idea of a super-natural power 
and superior culture coming from outside was prob­
ably related to general feelings of inferiority 
among the ancient villagers, who were aware of 
community exclusiveness and isolation. At the 
same time, they may have been conscious of cultural 
and religious distinctions between their own group 
and the out-groups, and felt a certain longing for 
the outseiderse' cultures.e4 2  
Unlike the Abrahamic traditions in which social integration 
rested upon one God, one faith and one religious practice, polit­
ical and social integration in Japan has traditionally been 
based upon a multiplicity of gods and faiths. Significantly, 
the theological artieculation of this syncretism (honjei-suijaku 
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setsu) emerged during the tenth through the twelfth centuries 
when the manorial system was becdming dominant. Shinto deities 
which had long been regarded as "sentient beings" in need of 
the Buddha' s salvation themselves , or as guardians of Buddhist 
temples, were no.w declared to be manifestations of the various 
Buddhas. After the middle of the Heian period, having lost 
imperial support , temples made use of this syncretistic theory 
to amalgamate Buddhism with the religious customs of the manors 
they controlled. Equally mundane were the reasons for the 
amalgamation of the ujigami of the warrior class with the 
indigenous deities of their estates.43 Whereas in the West it 
was heresy (i.te. medieval pluralism) which threatened the unity 
of Christendom, in Japan the emphasis on a "single practice" 
which appears in Kamakura Buddhism posed the greatest spiritual 
menace to the integration of society. In the course of time 
both the Pure Land and Nichiren sects became deeply involved 
in rebellion . Under such circumstances, in order to avoid 
conflict with the religious establishment of the community the 
new religious alternative represented by the marodogami was 
generally treated as a supplement to the traditional devoirs 
of village and family. Grafted into these primary groups, 
participation in the confraternity of the adventitious deity 
became obligatory, and then hereditary . In the end, it ceased 
to be a real alternative at all. The result was therefore 
syncretism, or what more t echnically might be called "centri­
petal social and cultural differentiation.t" 
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IV. The Late Medieval Period 
A. The Development of a More Complex Society 
As we approach the history of religious affiliationsn.nin 
the Late Medieval Period we come into relatively uncharted 
waters. Many histories of Japanese religion fail to devote so 
much as a single chapter to this period. Usually the events of 
the Ashikaga shogunate (13 38-1568) are treated as an appendage 
to--or a mere degeneration of-- the religion of the Kamakura 
period. Even then, the treatment of religious life during the 
period is often limited to such things as the rise of the 
Rinzai sect and the Gozan temples, the development of a new 
religious aesthetic, and the renewed influence of China and 
Chinese monks. An equally unsatisfactory approach gives sole 
credit to the Tokugawa period for the changes that actually 
began in Ashikaga. This tendency can be seen in the works of 
Tsuji Zennosuke and those who have followed him. Looking for 
the reasons of the "decline" of Buddhism in the modern period, 
many scholars have laid the blame primarily upon the Tokugawa 
shogunate which, in fact, had made the temples an arm of the 
state. Unfortunately, this exaggerated interest in the cor­
rupting influence of the Tokugawa regime on Buddhism has caused 
the best of scholars to overlook the still more decisive 
influences of the ground-swell of economic and social change 
upon religious institutions even before Tokugawa. �1uch of 
the history of the Ashikaga period is undeniably confusing and 
even unp+easant. The last half of the age- -the Warring States 
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Period (1467-1568)t--was a time of military turmoil and political 
fragme.nta tion. Most of the major temples and sects had their 
own armies to defend and extend their property and power. In 
such an age there were none who toul.d match, and few who could 
understand, the profundity of Dogen or Shinran. No one inheri­
ted the charismatic mantle of the prophet Nichiren. It was, 
in fact, an age of epigoni. One can easily forgive the scholar 
who hesitates to spend his time studying the lesser luminaries 
of the age--figures bearing such unmemorable names as Nikko 
- -
(there were actually two of them), Nissho, Nichiro, Nichij i, 
Nitcho, Nichiju, and Nisshin, just to mention some of the suc­
cessors of Nichiren. What is harder to absolve is the failure 
of so many historians to see and record the most crucial 
developments of the period. In some cases this seems to be 
the result of a schblarly penchant which equates the history of 
religion with the history of the main temples of the estab­
lished sects, their high priests and pontiffs, and the religious 
ideas they taught. As we shall see, the most important reli­
gious changes of this period grew out of that side of life 
which , we are sometimes told, is "below" ideas. If we are to 
understand the importance of Late Medieval Japanese religion 
it is clear that we must deal with that neglected stratum of 
evidence which lies beneath the official records of those who 
during this period sought, and fought, to inherit the leader­
ship of the Buddhist sects founded during the preceding 700tyears. 
During the Late Medieval Period many aspects of the 
• 
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religious affiliations of previous centuries continued in force. 
The lineage ideology , for example , persisted in a modified form 
and was finally adopted by smaller family units. The confra­
ternities of the early middle ages continued to grow , spreading 
the New Buddhism of the Kamakura period among various social and 
economic classes during the Muromachi period. With the growing 
division of labor and the subsequent definition of social groups 
under the Tokugawa regime monopolistic groups of artisans be-
. 44
came even more d .1st1nct and numerous. A distinctive commer-
cial ethic and ethos, standards for trade and instruction , came 
into existence.a45 Guilds were formally licensed by the govern­
ment .a46 Many guildsmen continued to worship the ancient deities 
of their trade. Others worshipped a common ujigami , ubusuna­
gami or household deity. Those who worked in the mountainsa- ­
hunters , woodcutters and charcoal makers- - bound themselves to­
gether in confraternities dedicated to the worship of various 
mountain deities . Carpenters , plasterers , thatchers, black­
smiths, and coopers formed confraternities for the worship of 
Shotoku Taishi. Financial agreements were drawn up while 
feasting in the presence of this god or culture hero. Horse 
dealers made their contracts before a statue of Horse -headed 
Kannon and had masses said for the repose of the souls of dead 
animals. 
In spite of this continuity, the transformations of 
religious affiliations and institutions during this period were 
most remarkable. Not all parts of the country, however , were 
' ·  
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affected to the same degree. D�ring the Ashikaga period, the 
- -
Kinki , Chugoku , Hokuriku and Tokaido regions underwent rapid 
economic and religious change. This contrasted strongly with 
comparatively backward and religiously conservative regions 
such as Kanta, Tohoku and Kyushu. In the more advanced parts 
of the country the great warrior households had lost their 
monopolistic control over agricultural tools as early as the 
Kamakura period. Finally even the lower peasarit classes were 
able to own tools and domestic animals. Double cropping be­
came widespread during the Kamakura period , so that by the 
Ashikaga period the yield Qf rice as much as doubled. The 
system of land tenure in these parts also differeda. from the 
rest of Japan. While the medieval land system (myoden) remained 
intact in the east , here a single cultivator might hold land 
rights (shiki) as  a proprietor, while owning other shiki as a 
cultivator or sub-cultivator of the land. Compared with es ­
tates in eastern Japan , the land in these economically advanced 
parts of the country t�nded to be divided into smaller units 
not differing greatly in size. The system of overlapping land 
rights gradually broke down the absolute distinction between 
lord and peasant, proprietor and cultivator , and loosened class 
differentials in general. Nevertheless the relatively small 
scale landholders called myoshu became the dominant class in 
these areas. 
During the Tokugawa period , the system of cultivation in 
the Capital Provinces ,  which had been based on kinship affilia-
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tions, was gradually transformed into a tenant-farmer system . 
This caused labor relations which had previously b�eri embedded 
in complex networks of religious and social obligations to be 
differentiated emotionally and conceptually from other respon­
sibilities. Traditional, paternalistic bonds were replaced by 
contractual relationshipst. As Thomas Smith points out, these 
new relations "were not relationships of indefinite term ex­
pected to go on and on, but relations entered into for the 
convenience of the moment, so that instead of being the guide 
lines of a way of life, they were episodes that passed and were 
quickly forgotten. 114 7  
In the less developed parts of Japan the story was much 
different. There, since the Kamakura period, various estate 
offices were generally held by one and the same family. Land 
holdings were of much greater scale than elsewhere since shiki 
rarely fell into the hands of the lower classes. Domestic 
animals and farm tools continued to be owned by these dominant 
classes. Whereas markets and money began to affect even the 
lower classes in the more advanced parts of the country, in the 
east manors continued to be economically isolated and self­
supporting for centuries. The money economy that finally did 
develop even in the east later on was created initially by the 
transformation of land-taxes (paid in kind) into cash by the 
daimyo in markets they controlled. For this reason a true sur­
plus economy was slow to develop.t48 
It was in the Capital Provinces and other parts of the 
country undergoing more rapid social and economic differentiation 
- -
' . 
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that we find the emergence of classes with a natural, ''elective 
affinity" for new modes of religious affiliation. Many of the 
most important changes in the religious communities of the Late 
Medieval period took place within new semi-autonomous villages 
called so ort�- During the political chaos of the early four-
teenth century when many of the warrior dozoku began to decline, 
petty manorial leaders and their dependents in the Capital 
Provinces began to form territorial federations to protect 
themselves and their ·own interests. Many of these areas became 
centers of provincial manufactures and crafts, or enjoyed a 
tradition of providing special foodstuffs for the imperial 
court. This presumably gave them some leverage in their strug­
gles with the lords of the surrounding manors.49 Gradually 
these villages became virtually corporate persons in the farm­
ing of taxes (jigeuke)t, litigation, self-defense, legislation 
dealing with local matters, irrigation, drainage, access to 
common property and the conduct of festivals. 
B. The Miyaza in the Late Medieval Period 
Unlike Tohoku, where one dozoku was often able to dom­
inate an entire community, the so of the Capital Provinces were 
controlled by groups of relatively autonomous families. These 
families, which often belonged simultaneously to the warrior 
and cultivator classes, were variously known as otona, toshiyori, 
sata (nin) , myoshu etc. Incidentally, these terms are identical 
with the titles used by the leaders of the new Shinto parish 
- soguilds which developed throughout the so. The materialization 
- -
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of parish guilds in these turbulent villages seems to lend added 
credence to Smith'ns observation that "the miyaza appeared only 
where the structure of privilege was relatively insecure and 
required exceptionally elaborate institutional support.n11 5 1  
The monopoly exercized by such guilds was not usually 
legitimated by myth, say in the way the ancient court had used 
the tales of the Kojiki to buttress its claim to hegemony. 
Instead, by presiding over the ceremonies of their shrine, 
guild leaders seemed to act out symbolically their domination 
of all other aspects of the community. One exception to this 
rule--a case where myth was used by a guild--also happens to 
be a good example of the establnishment of monopoly and its 
subsequent fate. 
A parish guild was estabnlished by a clique of cultivators 
and merchants in Tokuchin-ho of Imabori-go in Omi (Shiga Pre­
fecture) at the Hiyoshi Shrine in the late fourteenth or early 
fifteenth century. By 1488 the growing social differentiation 
and economic rivalries of the area had resulted in the division 
of the guild into East and West sections. By 1 5 66  each of 
these sections had to be further subdivided into Left artd Right 
guilds, resulting in a total of four sub-groups.52 According 
to a legend handed down by these guildsn, a certain Botaro, a 
trader in horses and cattle, lived in Imabori during the twelfth 
century. A powerful and influential man, Batara plied his 
trade throughout the land. Once while visiting Nara he saw a 
sign announcing an award which was being offered to any person 
- -
- -
- -
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who could kill the man-eating serpent which lived in the Saru-
taku Pond. Botaro immediately tethered his animals, pulled out 
a dagger and plunged into the pond where, as might be expected, 
he slew the serpent and split open its head. The people of the 
neighborhood who had long been terrorized by the creature re­
joiced to see the pond run red with its blood. When Emperor 
Goshirakawa heard of this exploit, he decided to bestow upon the 
hero whatever boon he asked. Now, it used to happen that as 
Botaro drove his herds along the roads they would stop and 
graze in the fields, causing much consternation among the farm-
ers. Botaro therefore asked the emperor to give his animals 
the right to graze along the side of all the roads he passed. 
The wish was granted and the emperor bestowed upon him a charter 
describing his privileges. This document, dated 1157, became 
the mythological charter for the cattle merchants in the go 
who as members of the miyaza sought to monopolize the trade in 
cattle and horses in the area. Even after this monopoly was 
broken up by the free market policy oft'tOda Nobunaga in the late 
sixteenth century, this document continued to be enshrined and 
worshipped by the people as a disease curing amulet. Once a 
year the lay-priest of the parish guild went to the shrine 
early in the morning and reverently brought forth the charter­
talisman from its storage place. Holding it above his head, 
the villagers passed beneath, praying for relief from their 
ailments. The custom died out only in the early twentieth cen­
tury.t53 
More typical of the fate of the miyaza in the Late 
. ,. 
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Medieval period is the parish guild in Kamikawarabayashi Village 
located just outside Osaka. Cotton was introduced into this re­
• 
gion in the late seventeenth century and became a cash-crop of 
. 54. d cons1 erable importance. After Genroku (1688) , the region was 
characterized by an increase in productivity, higher taxes and 
an intensification of class differences. As a result of changes 
in the mode of agricultural production, there was a remarkable 
decline in the number of hereditary servants, their place being 
taken by hokonin, a kind of rural proletariat. Finally, how­
ever, even these hokonin were replaced by day-laborers. These 
important changes in the economy and class-structure of the 
village also affected the composition of the local religious 
guild, or hongannin as it was called. The chart on p. 45 shows 
the relationship between membership in the guild and economic 
power in the year 1673.t55 · It shows that membership was gene­
rally commensurate with wealth (measured in koku, or yields) , 
but that this was not a one-to-one relationship. Other factors 
were at work in determining household status, for example, the 
age of the lineage. The changes that took place in the social 
structure of this village from 1673 on seem to have affected 
primarily the lower class households (genin iemochi and 
garazaike) and "retired" families which made up more than half 
of the families not enfranchised in 1673. The heads of these 
families turned their property over to their eldest sons and 
retired with their younger sons to form branch families. As 
such they enjoyed a "tax shelter" even though they were not 
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badly off. Because of the obvious unfairness of their status, 
these families were gradually enfranchised from this time on. 
In 1689, the number of enfranchised families rose from 26 to 37, 
while those not enfranchised went down to 24. 56 In 1732, en­
franchised families had risen to 38, the disenfranchised to 31. 
These changes in the composition of the guild suggest that the 
once fixed stem-branch type relations among the families of the 
village were breaking down. Personal ties based on reciprocity, 
cooperation and religious obligation were replaced by contrac­
tual relations. Guild membership came to be purchased as an 
appurtenance to a piece of land. In short, religious affilia­
tions were greatly altered by the growing social and economic 
differentiation of the community. 
The progressive enfranchisement that took place in this 
village transformed the local guild from a privileged clique 
(kabuza) into a more broadly based village guild, or muraza. 
This extension of privileges was aided by the addition of lower 
levels of enfranchisement which entitled other families to a 
smaller share .in the privileges of the guild. The deity of the 
village also underwent the typical transformation from clan 
deity to tutelary deity. 
From the example of Kamikawarabayashi Village, it is ob­
vious that the hiyakunin were not enfranchised on the basis of 
any abstract democratic principle or in a sudden, revolutionary 
way. On the contrary, more and more families were incorporated 
into the leadership of the parish through a series of gradually 
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expanding enclosures until nearly all villagers·, or rather all 
adult males, were included. 
A review of the overall history of the miyaza in the 
Capital Provinces duririg the Tokugawa period shows that the in­
stitution declined as the economic power of lower- class peasants 
increased. In the early seventeenth century traditional parish 
guilds were still dominated by the descendants of the myoshu 
class. Nevertheless, inroads were already being made into 
their power by the new rich who were gaining access to the 
miyaza or forming their own secondary, or auxiliary , guilds. 
After the shogunate commanded the bushi to retire to castle 
towns (or, if they chose to remain, to give up their swords and 
become farmers) the miyaza, freed from warrior control, began 
to fall into the hands of rising peasant classes. By the late .. 
seventeenth century many of the older families which remained 
in the guilds were no longer able to fulfill their finaricial 
obligations to the institution. This led to intensified squab­
bling between the guild members and the disenfranchised families 
of the community. From about 1780 to 1845 guilds throughout 
western Japan were beginning to open up to more enterprising 
families. By this time miyaza members were no longer better 
off than other villagers. When positions of leadership fell 
vacant they were filled by anybody who had lived in the area 
for a certain length of time, who was able to. make financial 
contributions to the guild and who was regarded as a person of 
good character. 57 This process of demonopolization (or 
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enfranchisement) would finally result in the emergence of the 
territorial parish (ujiko) of the Tokugawa and Meiji periods. 
C. The Development of the "Territorial Parish" 
In its complex documentary history, the changes in the 
words used for the Shinto parish (and its gods) often reflect 
crucial shifts in the class structure which supported and dom­
inated the institution. We have seen that in the Ancient and 
Early Medieval Periods, the uji-not-kami and ujibito were in 
control of indigenous community cults. In time, the ujibito 
became too absorbed in the affairs of the capital to return to 
their homes to preside over festivals. With the collapse of 
the clan system and the decline of the ujibito, control over 
these local cults began to fall into the hands of inferior 
classes, the "children of the clan" or ujiko.t58 From the mid­
dle of the Kamakura period through the Muromachi period the 
term ujibito began to be applied fictitiously to various 
festival organizations, especially to groups of believers con­
nected with sh1·ines and temples in the 8.£.· In some places the 
ujiko itself began to take on the characteristics of an exclu­
sive group. Documents which use the word ujiko in contrast to 
the common people of the village (murabito) suggest that the 
"children of the clan" had begun to occupy the monopolistic 
·position once held by the ujibito themselves.t59 Such ujiko 
were probably little different from the miyaza which we have 
been discussing. One also notices the influence of the dozoku 
in the makeup of these groups. In the thirteenth century, 
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various documents, including references by Nichiren, use the 
word ujiko more broadly to denote groups organized to seek 
divine favors and protection. In spite of its obviously Shinto 
connotations, the word ujiko is even found in Buddhist sermons 
for groups under the Buddha's protection. 
However complicated the history of the word 1s, it is 
clear that in the economically advanced so and go of the Capital 
Provinces the ujiko and the ujigami were first--as Japanese 
scholars are wont to say--"terri toriali zed." · Documents from 
the Omi region suggest that by about 1600  A.D. the word ujiko 
had begun to replace murabito as the name for the most inclu­
sive, residential body responsible for the cult of the terri­
torial god (now called, indiscriminately, UJ 1gami, ubusuna-
gami, or chinju-gami)t. By the end of the century this terri­
torial implication of the term ujiko had become nearly universal. 
The farther away one moves from the Capital Provinces, however, 
the more delayed is the development of these territorial 
parishes. These verbal changes, far from being accidental, seem .. 
to be a reflection of the rise of small client farmers to places 
of power and responsibility in these communities.t60  
A number of Japanese scholars have discussed the transfor­
mation of the ujigami from a lineage deity into a territorial 
god of the modern Shinto parish. This change, some argue, is 
a reflection of the more basic decline of consanguinity as 
the basi·s of social solidarity and the emergence of territorial 
communities in which a plurality of unrelated.households lived 
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. 61d . .h .together. 0 h t ers 1spute t 1s 1nterpretat1on. Ariga, for 
example, argues that clans from the beginning were territorial 
and political groups held together not by real kinship but by 
fictive ancestors (shutsuji no senzo)t. In contrast to the 
ancestor worship which became the province of Buddhism, these 
fictive (or ideological) ancestors were worshipped by people 
standing before shrines, rather than kneeling before graves 
or Buddhist altars. Their death-pollution was dealt with by 
Shinto rather than Buddhist rites. Because the social prestige 
and religio-magical efficacy associated with these fictive 
ancestors were so greatt, their worship naturally filtered down 
to the lower classes. At the lower end of the social scale, 
although these deities were enshrined in the family'ts Shinto 
altar, they were not regarded as ancestors since, as Ariga 
points out, nobody would believe that such families could have 
such illustrious progenitors. 
If Japanese society did not change from a kinship base to 
a territorial one tout simple, it is nevertheless true that 
with the rise of more independent households and the increasing 
population mobility of the Late Medieval Period the idea of 
kinship with a clan-god came to be used in a more openly fic­
titious way. By the beginning of the Tokugawa period only in 
Tohoku and in Kagoshima in southern Kyushu did a literal clan­
god continue to exist. In other places the lineage ideology 
embedded in the UJ1gami cult gave way to a territorial concept. 
The otherwise contradictory expression "the uJt1gami of such-
\ 
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and- such a place" became, and still 
. 
1s  , an everyday expression . 
Whether the deities of the dozoku of the earlier period became 
amalgamated with the deities of the community (as Yanagita 
suggests) or whether they became the ancestors of smaller 
families, the implication is cleart: lineage deities were 
losing their grip.t62 This shift in the way of talking about 
deities and parishes was, of course, extremely important. Gods 
which had once been the symbols of socio-religious cliques now 
became the focal point of a wider territorial integration of 
society. This was especially evident when new villages were 
founded by more than one kinship group. Under these circum-
. 
stances household deities were often transformed into gods of 
the new "territorial society. 11. 63  
D. Buddhist Institutions 
When we turn to religious affiliations with Buddhist 
institutions during the Late Medieval Period, once again the 
semi-autonomous villages of the Capital Provinces were the 
harbingers of change. Even before the promulgation of the 
temple registration (tera-uke) system of the Tokugawa period, 
a new and intense family consciousness had spread to the rising 
lower classes of these villages .t. Being a family associated 
with a temple, a danka, implied that the family had recognized 
ancestors. Having such ancestors was proof of the independence 
and worthiness of the household. The practices of these vil­
lages therefore anticipated the family-temple system created 
64by the Tokugawa government. Needless to say, the subsequent 
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rulings of the Tokugawa bakufu enhanced this growing family con­
sciousness. In cities as well as in villages, new temple 
registers put landlords and renters on the same footing. Both 
had ancestors and were therefore, as it were, "legitimate . "  
In the late Muromachi period, the leaders of these new 
family temples were often the otona class which controlled the 
so andt�- The seating arrangements in these temples--always 
symbolic of rank--were virtually the same as those in the mi­
yaza, which were dominated by the same class. The rights of 
temple families varied considerably. The rights of the "found­
ing temple families" (kaiki danka)t, recognized by the bakufu 
itself, included the right to make various financial decisions 
and to appoint the local priest. On the other hand, commoners 
belonging to temples owned by manors had very few rights. 
Daimyo who supported temples as danka naturally had nearly 
absolute control over their affairs. The family temple of com­
moners in more autonomous areas of the country stood between 
these extremes. Because such temples depended upon these 
families for financial support, the laymen played a large role 
in their management, and even had a voice in approving or dis­
approving a new priest. These danka had obligations as well as 
rights. If they failed to make contributions to their temple 
they could be refused the required temple certificate. In 
extreme cases they might be ousted from the temple or denied 
burial in its graveyard.t65 
During the late sixteenth century, the otona and other 
-53 -
well-to-do villagers began to invite hijiri to settle down and 
become priests of local temples and shrines. For the first 
time many anonymous places of worship acquired a namet, a history 
(often fabricated) , and even a sectarian identityt. Many ujidera 
once owned by medieval warriors were taken over by villages, 
hamlets or other territorial groups (kumi, kaito, buraku, etc . )  
and transformed into community propertyt. Small Buddha-halls 
(butsudo) enshrining such Buddhas as Kannon, Jizo or Yakushi, 
remained focal points of local culture and entertainment and 
never became connected with any particular sectt. Most of these 
butsudo were prayer temples (kito-ji) where suffrages were of­
fered not only for families but for individuals and the com­
munity itself. These temples, which were regarded as village 
property (sonji) , often became the meeting place for temple 
guilds (teraza) , institutions which wer� nearly identical with 
the Shinto miyaza. 
In the past, only the Nichiren sects had insisted that 
all members of a family, including the servants, be members of 
the same temple. It was only in the Tokugawa period however-­
and then only because of pressure from the government- - that it 
became customary for entire families to belong to one family 
temple . Before the government' s order in 1788 that all members 
of a family belong to the same sect, husbands and wives some­
times belonged to different temples. In such cases, the 
children would generally be enrolled in the father ' s  temple. 
Sometimes, however, the daughters would join their mothert' s  
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temple, the sons their father'ns. This kind of split affiliation 
seems to have been found primarily among the middle and lower 
classes, 1 . e • in households which had no clients to control . 
The freedom to change a family ' s  temple affiliation which had 
been recognized by the government in 1665 was taken away by 
official regulations in 1 7 7 2. The government finally realized 
that changing temple affiliations made it all the more diffi­
cult to keep track of the population. 
When it finally became mandatory for families to j oin a 
family temple, family ties, neighborhood obligations and local 
power relations often determined which temple a family chose. 
Class also entered into the picture. I n  some villages, for 
example, families belonging to one family temple were all mem­
bers of the Old Guild of the Shinto shrine. Members of another 
family temple in the same community might be members of a rival 
New Guild. In other places, client families were all danka of 
the local Pure Land or True Pure Land temple while their patrons 
were affiliated with a Zen or Nichiren sect. Often the True 
Pure Land sect attracted the lowest class danka. Only a few 
66of the wealthier merchants were found in this sect.n
The Late Medieval Period also saw the decline of the 
medieval "general cemetery" and the growth of cemeteries at­
tached to family temples. It was only during the Tokugawa 
period that the average temple began to manage funerals itself. 
Before this, death was generally handled by confraternities or 
neighborhood associations. Since graves could not be moved 
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when a family settled in a new community, a family's temple 
affiliations did not always coincide with its place of resi­
dence. 67t. Stone grave markers became common after the introduc­
tion of the tera-uke system and symbolized the new independence 
of the smaller families. The ancestral services of the medie­
val warrior now became the standard funeral of all classes. 
The homes of even lower-class families became important places 
for Buddhist worship. Under the tera.-.uke system all families 
wanted their own Buddhist altar (butsudan) as a symbol of 
their proper registration and affiliation with such-and-such a 
sect. Whereas previously only warriors needed a special room 
for the observances connected with their ancestral cult, after 
the late seventeenth century it became common for even ordinary 
peasants to have a special room or alcove set aside for the 
butsudan. · These rooms were used for saying masses for the 
dead, for funerals and meetings of confraternities. 
E. The Influence of Pilgrimage on Religious Institutions 
We have seen how during the Early Middle Ages holy men 
wandered through the countryside establishing confraternities 
and cultic orders dedicated to the worship of adventitious 
deities and Buddhas. We have also seeri that in the Late 
Medieval Period these wayfarers began to settle down and serve 
as priests in shrines and family temples. As these religious 
virtuosi became sedentary, the common people became mobile. 
Whereas in the Early Medieval Period the hijiri had brought the 
marodogami , his miracles, spells and amulets to the villagers, 
• 
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it was now the latter who, as pilgrims, began to visit the 
marodogami at his native shrine. This increase in pilgrimage 
was due primarily to the improved financial position of the 
lower classes, the pacification of the country, and the spread 
of better and safer transportation during the Tokugawa period. 
While there are records of okagemairi dating from the middle 
of the sixteenth century , after the beginning of the eighteenth 
century participants in these pilgrimages to Ise quadrupled. 6 8  
At the peak of the pilgrimage season to the Kumano shrines in 
southern Kii (Wakayama Prefecture) in 1716 as many as 4,776 
people stayed in the inns of Tanabe during one week alone. 
Twenty-two years later about 758 people put up in these inns 
on one day alone.e69 In this period there was even the custom, 
called sensharei, of visiting a thousand shrines and pasting 
to them pieces of paper stamped with one ' s  name. Some people 
spent so much time roaming about the countryside on pilgrimages 
that they were criticized for "pestering" the gods.e7 0  When 
pilgrims became too numerous to be accommeodated by temple inns 
(shukubo), purely commercial inns began to spring up along the 
pilgrimage routes. Since there were no priests to instill an 
atmosphere of  respect, and because the Buddhist dietary re� 
strictions could easily be neglected, a holiday atmosphere 
arose which characterizes Japanese "pilgrimage" to this day. 
Before this, as Yanagita points out, the dangers and difficul­
ties of travel forced the pilgrim to have faith.e7 1  
The surge of popular pilgrimage during the Tokugawa 
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period was made possible by a specific type of religious affil­
iation , the repiesentational confraternity (daisanko)a. Members 
of such groups pooled their tesources so that at least one of 
their number (chosen by lot or rotation) could go to Ise, Ku­
mano, Konpira in Shikoku , Dewasanzan iri Tohoku , Dazaifu in 
Kyushu or elsewhere to worship and secure amulets for the whole 
.
groupa. The daisanko was only one of several .atypes of confra­
ternity which flourished during the Late Medieval Period. Some 
ko were organized for the worship of nature deities such as 
mountain or field gods , the sun or the moon . Others were de­
voted to the cult of .the uj igami of a particular place. Re- . 
lated to these groups were the kiriake- ko which gathered 
twice a year to worship the ancestors who had founded the vil­
lage. Groups of this sort were probably among the oldest 
confr�ternities in Japan and are difficult to distinguish from 
the parish per se.  Because taking part in the activities of 
these groups was closely related to a family ' s  identity as a 
member of the community , participation was generally obligatory. 
In addition to their religious activities , members of these 
village-wide confraterrtities were involved in an encompass.ing 
network of social obligations such as repairing roads , dams 
and bridges . Some were , in fact , virtually identical with such 
. . . 7 2 . 1 organizations as k ·territoria the umi .  
Quite different were those confraternities whose boun­
daries extended beyond the local community. Confraternities 
devoted to the worship of Amida , Kannon , Jizo or ·aother Buddhist 
deities are examples of this type. Many of these deities had 
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originally been patronized by the court and came under the pro­
tection of local villages only after the decline of the aristo­
cratic and warrior clasnses. Like the represnentational confra­
ternities, these ko shared a common faith with believers in 
other villages. Participation in these groups was comparatively 
voluntary.n7 3  
F. The Spread of the Honganji Sect 
The most powerful of these confraternities were those or­
ganized under the aegis of the Honganji sect of Pure Land Budd­
hism. The collapsing manorial system and the rising s o  and go 
type villages (with their small scale proprietors, or myoshu) 
of the Kinki, Chugoku, Hokuriku, and Tokaido areas provided 
fertile soil for the growth of this sect. Unlike other Buddhist 
sects which had arisen during the Heian and Kamakura periods, 
the Honganji sect relied directly upon the contributions of the 
faithful for its financial and military support. Because it 
was no longer beholden to the medieval manor for its support; 
the dojo and ko of the sect naturally became the breeding 
grounds for unrest and rebellionn. During the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries confraternities of this Pure Land sect 
(sometimes called Ikko) became involved in violent uprisings 
called Ikko-ikki.n74 I n  eastern Japan, however, the sect failed 
to grow in spite of Shinran'ns twenty year ministry and Rennyo's 
three missionary journeys. In 1465 even the Senshuji-ha, 
another Pure Land sect, found it advantageous to move from 
Kanto to the I s e  area in western Japan. In the east, not only 
G. 
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was there no class con1parable to the myoshu of western Japan to 
support the sect; the powerful eastern daimyo actively dis­
couraged the spread of nembutsu-ko by force of arms. After the 
Sengoku period, when it was no longer possible to restrict the 
sect forcibly, many daimyo became members themselves. By so 
doing they were able to manipulate (and neutralize) these groups 
from within. Honganji's potential for developing into a radical 
(and nearly monotheistic) alternative to the syncretistic 
mainstream of Japanese religion, was also undercut by various 
theological compromises promulgated by the leadership of the 
sect itself. 
A Typology of the Ko 
Ikeda Yoshisuke has constructed a typology of these con­
fraternities which helps to clarify the roles they played in 
Japanese society. Defining ko as "common interest associations" 
he classifies them according to their relationships with the 
community as a whole. There are three types : 
I. Those which transcend the local community. 
II. Those which are coextensive with the local 
community. 
III. Those which are subsumed by the local community. 
Type I confraternities have supra-territorial connections and 
therefore tend to have a centrifugal effect upon the local com­
munity. For example there were the Pure Land confraternities 
of some provinces which began to take a highly critical attitude 
towards the local ujigami and finally became involved in the 
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Ikko-ikki rebellions mentioned above. Type II confraternities 
are common interest associations or associations based on faith. 
. . 76
Neverth 1 ess , t hey are not genera 11y vo1untary associations. e 
Because membership in these confraternities is the same as 
membership in the community , individuals are not free to join 
or leave the group at will. Since they reflect the social 
hierarchy of the community , they tend to be less egalitarian 
than other confraternities. Individuals automatically join 
such groups upon reaching a certain age or status in life. This 
type tends to be hostile to outside influences such as the 
adventitious deity and is the most affirmative of the local 
status quo of all confraternal groups. Type III, having three 
sub-types, is more complicated. Some of these groups (III-A) 
set up no requirements for membership except membership in the 
larger community. Examples are 1) recreation or travel asso­
ciations which are the most open to voluntary participation, 
and 2) financial groups (mujin-ko or tanomoshi-ko) which are 
more gemeinschaftlich and tend to be obligatory .  Occupational 
groups (III-B) which have fixed requirements for membership 
are relatively closed and involuntary. Type III-C includes 
subsections of the community which attempt to perpetuate privi­
lege (cf. the kabuza above) or defend themselves against dist­
crimination. New immigrants to a village might form a confra­
ternity of the latter sort. Type III groups may therefore , 
depending on the circumstances, exert either a centrifugal or 
a centripetal influence upon the ambient community.77 
2 .  
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From this typology it is obvious that while they are often 
indiscriminantly treated as voluntary common-interest associa­
tions , there is considerable latitude in the nature of partici­
pation in these groups. Membership in some is voluntary and 
open , while in others it is involuntary and closed . As with 
the Christian sect,  an affiliation which is voluntary in the 
first generation may become obligatory in the second. What 
nearly all have in common are the followinga: 
1. Whether they are coextensive with, smaller or greater than 
the local community , nearly all confraternities can be de­
fined in terms of their relationships with a specific 
territorial society. 
Most are marked by a cooperative, gemeinschaftlich spirit . 
For this reason the institution easily falls prey to the 
competitiveness of the modern age. 
3 .  As common-interest associations , whether their a.im is a 
common religious faith or a sweepstakes (muj in-ko) , most 
are quite "rational" (in the \!Jeberian sense of Zweckration­
itat . )  One of their functions is to restrict and regulate 
cooperation in the village. 
4 .  Each member-household makes a direct contribution to the 
group. 
5 .  While not all are leaders , all members enjoy more or less 
equa1 . h . h 78rig ts 1n t e group . 
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H. Ko and Miyaza 
There are interesting parallels between these confraterni­
ties and the miyaza, both of which evolved within the encom­
passing framework of the medieval manor. Both had historical 
relations with the warrior class. Some ko which we now think 
of as peasant organizations, such as the Ise-ko of the 
Tokugawa period, were actually founded by warrior-cultivator 
families in the middle ages. Both institutions seem to have 
arisen first in the Capital Provinces, spreading to other areas 
of the country during the Late Medieval Period. Both therefore 
developed in areas where the economy was relatively advanced.79 
Both the miyaza and the ko were characterized by rotating 
offices, the miyaza generally changing officers on a yearly 
basist, while those in the ko often changed every month. Both 
functioned as good-luck institutions in their villages, their 
members distributing amuletst, the miyaza at New Year'ts, the ko 
after members returned from a pilgrimage. I have already 
pointed out that during the late Tokugawa period parish guilds 
(especially the muraza) became synonymous with the parish 
(ujiko) itself. Likewise, in areas where membership in the 
confraternity was identical with membership in the community 
(Ikeda' s Type II) , the village meeting (yoriai) actually became 
synonymous with a meeting of the ko (koyoriai)t. s o  These 
similarities do not, of course, disguise the fact that the two 
groups were organized along radically different lines. While 
the cultic life of the parish guild focused upon the tutelary 
deity of the village, many confraternities developed in 
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response to a source of  sacrality lying outside the community . 
While residence, lineage and occupation played important roles 
in the infrastructure of many confraternities , the emphasis on 
faith in a specific , functional adventitious deity set them 
apart from the territorial parish and its guilds. The miyaza ,  
especially in earlier timesa, was organized according to 
strictly hierarchical principles so that it became the focal 
point of the tensions between the uj ibito and ujiko , samurai 
and farmers , old and new families, patrons and cl ients , the 
rich and the poor.  The confraternitv (with the exception of 
Ikeda ' s  Tvue II) was a comparatively egalit arian organization. 81 
V .  The Modern Period 
In the early decades of the Modern Period many of the 
religious institutions of Late Medieval times remained intact. 
Even under the influence of Meij i nationalism , the Shinto 
parish remained a focal point of the particularistic loyalties 
of the local community. The very taboos and abstinences of 
one village served to set it off from its neighborsa. In one 
parish it was forbidden to raise black horses, while in the 
next the ujigami forbade his parishioners to eat eggs , noodles , 
or cucumbers. The "j ealousy" of this deity was proverbial . 
He especially disliked seeing the number of his ujiko decrease . 
Equally distasteful- - and forbidden- -was casual participation 
in his cult by outsiders. Although they were more inclusive 
than the earlier monopolistic cliques , participation in these 
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liturgical communities was still carefully controlled. The 
territorial nature of the Late Medieval parish was especially 
important to the village, whose border itself ''was the entrance 
to the outside world, a world ruled by different gods and 
possessing a different language, time system, and moral code.11a8 2  
Brides from other villages became members of the ujiko only 
after they had lived in the village for a year or twoa. Before 
an adopted son-in-law (mukoyoshi) who was to carry on the 
family name could enter his wifea' s  home, he might be expected 
to carry a palanquin in the festival of the local Shinto 
shrine. Other adults who moved into the parish were usually 
admitted to the local cult after making a ritualistic "first 
visit'' to the shrine and paying a fee. This was usually de­
layed for a year or two after a familya' s  arrival . In some 
cases, outsiders were never accepted as true uj iko . In some 
villages when a person could not return to his hometown for the 
New Yeara' s  celebration a clod of earth from the precincts of 
the uj igami ' s  shrine was mailed to him. This, again, is an 
indication of the territorial and particularistic nature of 
Shinto affiliations. 
A .  The Delocalization of Territorial Religious Institutions 
In modern times many things conspired to weaken these 
territorial bonds. The government ' s  policy of shrine mergers 
had the effect of uprooting religious affiliations which had 
evolved naturally over the centuries .  Military conscaription 
made it impossible for village youths to observe the religious 
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taboos of their natal ujigami. Above all, it was population 
mobility itself which did the greatest damage to these religious 
institutions. Farmers began to take up by-employments which, 
taking them away from their villages for a good part of the 
week, eroded the solidarity of the local community. While ur­
banization itself may not have produced modernity,t83 the 
institutions which grew up in the city combined with the dis­
ruptive influences of demographic change unquestionably weakened 
the gemeinschaftlich ties of the village. These changes also 
hastened the formation of nuclear families and the consequent 
division of generations, the children moving to the cities while 
their parents and grandparents remained at home in the village. 
With the young people gone, there was often a shortage of man­
power in the villages for observing Shinto festivals.t84 Some 
villages had to hire outsiders to help them carry out these 
celebrations. In one village I visited in Wakayama Prefecture, 
there were so few young people left that trucks had to be used 
to carry the sacred palanquins in the festival parade. 
While village headmen often serve as priests , the special 
religious rights and duties which other families had tradi­
tionally enjoyed began to break down in the Modern Period. 
Shrine-maidens who fo1merly were expected to be virgins of 
such-and-such an age and lineage nowadays are selected from 
among students who have no special connection with the parish. 
They regard their work for the shrine as a part-time j ob 
(arubaito) .t85 Shinto priests now accept and even solicit dona-
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tions from strangers. Since offerings to a shrine had always 
been a token of religious participation, this too is symptomatic 
of the breakdown of the territorial integrity of the parish. 
While it was not uncommon for a family to belong to more than 
one shrine in the pre-modern period, this usually happened only 
when the local parish was included in the domain of a larger 
one. In recent times, however, overlapping parish affiliations 
(chofuku ujiko) have become a common phenomenon. Children of 
the same parents often belong to different Shinto parishes. 
Yanagita, for example, tells us that although his family resided 
in Tokyo for some fifty years, because they were constantly 
moving, he and his siblings belonged to several different ujiko 
. h . 861n t e city. The sub-urbanization of the postwar years had 
an eroding impact on religious affiliations similar to the 
process of urbanization itself. Morioka Kiyomi in his study of 
Nozaki found a high correlation between a sense of parish 
membership and the length of a family's residence in this suburb 
of Tokyo. Conversely, because of the territorial nature of the 
Shinto parish (and the particularism of all Japanese groups) 
families moving into the suburbs do not feel much attachment to 
. . . . 8 7the1r new uJ1gam1. Even Japanese Christians complain how 
difficult it is for them--sociallyt- -to move from one parish to 
another. Such demographic changes did nothing, of course, to 
enhance the solidarity of kin or parish. On the contrary, 
they resulted in a much weaker sense of affiliation with re­
ligious institutions and encouraged the growth of the more 
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transient religious style of individuals whom I shall call 
"clients. "  
B. Changes in Buddhist Institutions 
Urbanization also had a detrimental effect upon Buddhist 
institutions. In many families which had moved to the city--
and where no deaths had occurred in recent years--the name and 
location of the family's temple were often forgotten. I f  the 
older generation was left behind when the young people moved to 
the city, there might be no one in the new urban households to 
carry on the ancestral cult or instruct the younger generation 
in its piety. Today , places like Nagoya which are keen on city 
planning are setting up cemeteries in the suburbs. Separated 
geographically from the family templen, these cemeteries resemble 
large American-style non-denominational "memorial parks.n" Since 
people will no longer have reason to pay a call on the Buddhist 
priest when they visit their family graves, these cemeteries will 
be likely to weaken still further their religious affiliations.88 
Even in the Tokugawa period a number of contemporary observers 
complained that confraternities had degenerated into occasions 
for feasting and gossip alone.n89 In modern Japan these groups 
have con tinued to decline. Many were discontinued and were 
never again revived after the men of the community were con­
scripted in the last war. Others were taken over by women in 
the men's absence and have remained in their hands ever since. 
Many nembutsu-ko which meet once a month to recite sutras or 
sing hymns actually functionn.nas senior citizensn' clubs. Perhaps 
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the most important reason for the decline of these associations 
is that the secular role they once played as cooperative groups 
in their communities is no longer needed in modern Japanese 
societya. After the Meiji period participation in many common 
interest associations which had previously been obligatory be-
90came voluntary . Such voluntary groups, especially when based 
on "faith alone,a" are notoriously difficult to maintain in 
Japan. 
In the Modern Period new types of religious affiliation 
began to supplement, threaten and replace those of the Late 
Medieval Period. Here I shall mention only some of the most 
important. 
C. Civil Religion 
During the decades of hyperventilated nationalization which 
preceeded the Pacific War , being Japanese was itself a kind of 
religious affiliation. One of the majaor problems for the new 
Meij i government was how to generate a truly national spirit 
that would be strong enough to rechannel the particularistic 
loyalties symbolized by the local uj igamia. The government was 
also concerned to prevent the growth of class consciousness in 
villages which were being exploited by landlords, industry and 
government alike. The aim of the government' s  ideological 
program during these turbulent years was the creation of a 
patriotic but depoliticized village symbolized by the so-called 
"imperial farmer.a" After the effects of the world depression 
of 1929 began to be felt in Japan , many of the urban unemployed 
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sought to return to their families in the countryside. Often 
they found the way barred by the elders of the village who 
claimed that the village was too poor or its land too scarce to 
support the urban refugeest. They feared that city ways might 
corrupt village morals. 91 For this reason, many of the uprooted 
were unable to return to the village Gemeinschaft which had been 
the traditional solice of the Japanese folk. Instead, at every 
turn--in factories, schools, and on the street--they were 
treated to the Sirens' song of the family-state. Officially at 
least, the nation came to regard itself as one extended family 
or village. Since both family and village had been in some 
sense religious corporations, the sacred nature of the emerging 
family-state was obvious. 
The "immanental theocracy1 1
9 2  which the government con­
cocted in order to achieve these ends was as artificial and 
contrived as the mythology of the Kojiki itselft. While the 
imperial family had existed for well over a millenium, the im­
perials system which now emerged as an ideological technique 
for controlling the entire populace was something rather new. 
Mass media were employed to spread among commoners the archaic 
imperial mythology which in the past had been the serious make­
believe of aristocratic and military circles alone. 
After 1887 when Japan failed to win a revision of her 
"unequal treaties".with western powers, a host of religio­
political societies began to spring up throughout the land until, 
by 1936, they numbered nearly 7 50. By seeking to reassert the 
spiritual unity of the nation in the face of the double threat 
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of western imperialism and internal disintegration, these groups 
mediated between traditional religious and political outlooks 
and the emerging state cult. Since nearly all religious and 
political bodies contributed to the generation of the symbols 
and slogans of the new ideology, clearly more was involved in 
prewar Japanese patriotism than "State Shinto" or "Shinto 
Nationalism.119 3  Too complicated to be identified with Shinto 
alone, the halo of symbols and slogans and emotions which con­
gealed around Japan in those years would better be denoted by 
II • • IImore genera 1 term sue h as c1v1 re 1 • 94some • 1 1g1on. The pivotal 
symbols in this religion were the sacred ancestors of the im­
perial family. By homo1ogizing these deities (i . e. the lineage 
ideology of ancient Japan) with the ancestor worship of the 
common people, the government thought to create a feeling of 
national unity and dedication. The machinations of Japan'ns 
new industrial and military leaders which caused such suffering 
and deprivations among the rural masses, were now beautified 
as the "wish" of the imperial ancestorsn. 
Before 1 94 5 - -and to a considerable extent even afterwards 
--ancestors were a primary religious symbol of conscience.n95 
To honor them was the mark of a solid charactern. To dishonor 
them, was to act without scruples--and to court misfortune. By 
grafting their schemes into this ingenuous religious and moral 
faith--i.e. by manipulating guiltn- -government ideologists 
sought to sublimate and raise the loyalties of families to the 
level of a new national consciousness. An excellent example of 
the psychological effectiveness of this manipulation can be 
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seen in a novel by Murayama Tomoyoshi, a writer active in the 
-
proletarian art movement. Arrested in 1932, he underwent tenko 
(ideological conversion to the imperial ideology) and for two 
years after his release from prison devoted himself to writing 
"conversion novels.t" In  his book Byakuya (The \\Thi te Night) , he 
-
describes the psychology of tenko. The following passage is a 
vivid illustration of the role of ancestors as symbols and 
agents of conscience. 
After his second summer there (in prison)t, absolutely
shut away from fresh air, his mind was eroded by some­
thing undefined and invincible. He felt as though
his flesh and blood, or rather something mysteriously 
a part of his own father and mother, and of their fore­
bearers from time immemorial, whose faces, names and 
lives had long since perished was eating away his 
existence, which was after all an infinitesimally
small particle of their posterity. However hard he 
tried to cry out at them, to push them aside, and to 
drive them out, it was of no avail. In his struggle 
with his invisible foes, day in and night out, he 
groaned, struck his. head with his fists, and scratched 
the wall with nails.t96 
The official consciousness--and c.onscience--propagated by 
the government resonated with other aspects of the folk tradition 
as well. Maruyama Masao went as far as to suggest that the 
village itself was the very prototype of the National Essence 
(kokutai) b eing fabricated by the government. 
The village Gemeinschaft is based on dozoku (including
fictitious) ties, common religious rituals, and the 
"old custom of neighborhood cooperation.t" Without 
allowing the individual his autonomy, it is an emot­
tional, face-to-face unity which avoids any honest 
confrontation of interests or the clarifications of 
the real basis for decision- making. It is the foun­
tainhead of Japan's "indigenous faith" and a true unity
of authority (seen especially in its control over the 
rights to common lands and water) and affection 
(political and economic "parent-child" relations)t� For 
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these reasons , the village Gemeinschaft is a "model" 
for traditional human relataions and makes up the
smallest "cell" of the National Essence (kokutai) .97  
This position has been questioned in recent years , espe-
cially by Irokawa Daikichi. According to Irokawa ,  the village 
Gemeinschaft "served as the base from which the peopJ,.e could 
organize against and resist outside authoritiesa. If the West 
hadn't arrived on the scene during the latter part of the nine-
--
teenth century , the kyodotai would have been the basis of Japan ' s  
indigenous development and it would have brought forward a grass­
roots form of democratic development.a1 1 9 8  It is, in fact , un­
questionable that many of the government ' s  ideological projects 
were non-resonating , or even dissonant vis-a-vis the folk tra­
dition. Some policies such as the shrine consolidation program 
produced social cacaphony and had to be dropped . Some concepts-­
such as kokutai , chuko ippon (the unity of loyalty and filial 
piety) and kazokushugi (familyism) resonated at such weird and 
unfamiliar frequencies that school children assimilated them 
only gradually if at all. Another dissonant item in the new 
national cult was the creation of imperial festivals celebrated 
according to the solar calendar. This series of festivals was 
widely ignored in the villages , except in the village schools.a99 
In spite of these points of friction , the village and the 
family undeniably contributed to the stock of controlling sym­
bols and values of the civil religion. Thousands of villages 
in which headmen doubled as Shinto priests were virtually 
microcosms of the "unity of religion and government" which the 
government was seeking to promote at the national level . Like-
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wise, the kinship systems of many parts of Japan (but not all) 
also seemed to be a reflection of the paternalism of the family­
state. What is more, as we shall see latern1 0 0  there was hardly 
any alternative to the ethos of these primary institutions in 
Japan. Dore and Ouchi have therefore not exaggerated their 
point when they claim that the village spirit was a "facilitating 
condition" leading to the rise of fascism in Japan.n1 0 1  
In the history of religious affiliations which we have 
been tracing, the prewar civil religion marked the highpoint 
of public participation. The nation itself was enfranchised-­
and mobilized--as the holy community. Like the ancestral uji­
gami faith upon which it was built, the civil religion promoted 
intimate and irrational feelings of dependence and loyalty, 
collectivistic emotions, and an uncritical ethos of obedience.n10 2 
Nearly all religious and political groups except Protestant 
Christianity and the Communist Party became imbued by its "false 
consciousness.'' As a submerged ideology, not a few of its 
values and symbols continue to influence the Japanese self-
image in the postwar period. This can be seen not only in the 
New Religions but in the spate of books and articles dealing 
with the "essence" of Japanese culture (Nihon bunka ron) in 
recent years. 
It could be argued that the spiritual successor of the 
family-state in the postwar period is the Japanese company. 
Many of these companies try to generate a spirit of comradeship, 
not unlike that of a religious, or moral, community. Employees 
are sent for weekend retreats in Zen temples, or are given 
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other forms of spiritual education (seishin kyoiku) at company 
expense. The workday itself often begins with calisthenics and 
the singing of the company song (shakun)n. These songs seem to 
be contemporary versions of the principles (kakun) of family 
enterprises in the premodern period. To Western ears, most of 
these ditties are moralistic and maudlin in the extreme. I 
once walked into a fashionable tea shop next to Tokyo's Meguro 
Station just before business began. Standing in a circle a­
round the manager, I overheard eight young people chanting in 
unison" 
We are grateful to the people of the world !  
We will not forget that our shop has been set 
up for the sake of the customer !  
Sharing both happiness and sorrow, we will cooperate
and not forget to encourage each other! 
Setting aside the past and the anxiety of the morrow 
we will not forget to give our all for the work 
before us today ! 
The twenty odd shakun I have collected and studied since 
that day consistently celebrate the same values : harmony, 
cooperation, integrity and an unflagging devotion to the cause. 
Judging from the words of these songs, the purpose of the firm 
is not material gain but "service" to the nation, and indeed, 
to the world. No deity could be adulated more than the steel 
company praised in its official song as "the camellia and rain­
bow of our hopes,n" "the unity of love and harmony,n" "the glory 
of history," "the fresh breath of dawn,n" "the flower of sin­
cerity," "our pride," and "our prayer.n" 
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D. The Devotee and the ''Marketing'' of New Religions 
Of the religious affiliations one associates with modern 
Japan, the New Religions are without doubt the best known. Like 
the territorial Shinto parish, family temple, Pure Land confra­
ternity, and the miyaza, the great majtority of these New Reli­
gions, starting with Tenrikyo, Kurozumikyo and Konkokyo in the 
nineteenth century, first emerged in the parts of the country 
. . 103wh .1ch were un . d  economic c ange. The spread dergo1ng most rap1 h 
of these religions in the nineteenth century may therefore be 
regarded as a symptom of the breakdown of the traditional vil­
lage Gemeinschaft. As so often happened in the past, the deter­
ioration of the cohesivenes s of the local community· ·tlowered its 
resistance to infiltration by adventitious deities. The most 
spectacular period in the development of these New Religions 
was the postwar period. This can be traced to the humiliation 
of losing the war and to the anxiety which grew out of the 
radical demographic dislocations of these years. In 1950, 70% 
of the Japanese people still lived in the countryside. This 
figure includes those who had fled from the cities where their 
homes had been destroyed during the last months of the war. By 
1963, the ratio of urban to rural populations had been reversed, 
with 70% now living in the cities .  This tremendous dislocation 
of the population caused considerable emotional stress, espe-
cially among those classes not under the protection of powerful 
industrial patrons or labor unions.t104 It was people of this 
sort--and not merely the Lumpenproletariat--who had the greatest 
elective affinity for the New Religions during the time of their 
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phenomenal growth from 1950 to 196 5. 
Affiliations with the New Religions were both different 
from and similar to those of pre-modern religious institutions. 
Like groups in the traditional village, the New Religions made 
use of fictive parent-child relations at all levels. The group 
meetings (hoza and zadankai) of some of these religions resem­
bled the more egalitarian of the pre-modern confraternities. In 
fact, Ikeda Yoshisuke sees the New Religions as institutions 
growing out of his Type I confraternity--i.ne . ,  a supra- local 
association based on a commonly shared religious faith. The 
New Religions, especially before the war, shared many of the 
organizational strengths and weaknesses of the traditional ko.-
The missionary of the New Religion approached the village as a 
stranger, as a messenger of an adventitious deity. Typically, 
a congregation collected around him, grew for a while, and then 
became an established feature of the community. Soon it reached 
its maximum growth and became static. The particularistic loy­
alties within both the community and the local congregation 
often proved stronger than ties with the sect ' s  headquarters . 
After the war, however, the more enterprising of these religions 
developed a new "market approach"--the "Coca-Cola method" as 
Ikado Fujio puts it--which was more successful when dealing with 
a mobile population of religious consumers. Ikado points out 
that the organization of these institutions "is very similar to, 
or even more rationalized than economic and political ones."n1 0 5  
Most of the devotees of these New Religions initially 
join not out of any profound interest in religion but for reasons 
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of health or " interest" in the extraordinary world of spirits and 
miracles. In a sµrvey I conducted in 1976 among 688 members of 
of Sekai Mahikari Bunmei Kyodan, an exorcaistic cult founded by 
Okada Kotama in 1959 ,  the following reasons were given for join-
ing the sect (a number of individuals gave more than one reason. 
for joining). 
MOTIVE PERCENTAGE 
Sickness. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 . 7
Economic  anxiety . . . . a. . . .  . 3 . 3
Family problems . . .a . . . . .  . 7. 8 
Problems with people outside 
the family . . . . . . . . . . . 3 . 5
Marital problems . . . . a. . . .  . 1 . 3
Interest in miracles . . . a. . a. 1 9 . 6
Interest in religion . . a. . . .  . 9. 6 
Interest in spirits . . . . . .  . 16. 6 
Anxiety over the breakdown 
of society (politics, 
pollution , etc. ) . . . . . . .  . 4. 9 
No answer . . a. . . . . . . . .  . 10.2 
This survey shows that in the comparatively prosperous 
1970s , financial worries were negligible as a factor for j oin­
ing the sect. The high level of interest in spirits (1. 7 
times as high as interest in religion per se) is due largely to 
the folk belief emphasized by the sect that illness and other 
misfortunes are caused by evil spirits. Thus those who j oin 
the sect because they are interested in spirits are closely re­
lated to those who join expecting a miracle or because of ill 
health. The great maj ority join the sect hoping to receive 
some practical benefit from their affiliation. 
Equally revealing are the ways in which people find out 
about the group. The following responses were given : 
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INFLUENCE PERCENTAGE 
Newspapers and advertising . . . . .  22 . S  
Lectures and testimonial meetings . 6 . 1
Recommended by a person in the 
same line of work . . . a. . . .  . 1 . 5
Recommended by a person in the 
same place of work . . . . . . .  . 5 . 2
Recommended by a superior . . . a. . 6 . 4
Recommended by a relative . . . .  . 37 . 5  
Recommended by a friend . . . . a. . 2 0 . 8  
Recommended by a stranger . . . .  . 5 . 7  
No answer . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 .  2 
Here we see that the most important single factor in pro­
pagating the sect is kinshipa- -orie of the linchpins of religious 
affiliations throughout Japanese historya. If we assume that 
among the friends who recommended the sect a large number are 
neighbors , it seems that Blut und Boden continue to be the most 
important influences in the recruiting of these groups. If this 
is soa, it would seem that the New Religions are spread not just 
by systematic marketing techniques but through the personal 
influences of kith and kin. In other words, these affiliations 
are establaished not by a customer making a rational selection 
among alternative products in the "supermarket" of sects and 
deities . On the contrary , the (potential) customer stays at home 
and knows little or nothing about these religious alternatives 
until a friend or relative drops by with the Good News about 
messiah A ,  sect B ,  and miracles C, D, E . . . .  This kind of re­
cruiting is therefore closer to a call by the Avon lady (in 
Japana: Pola) than to Berger and Luckmann ' s  "supermarket model" 
. ·of religious propagat ion. 106 
. . 
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E. The Clientt: Transient, Ad Hock Religious Affiliations 
Compared with the behavior of these devotees, little is 
known about the behavior of religious "clients"--people who 
establish only transient, .ad hoc relations with temples, shrines, 
fortune-tellers and healers. These are people who, for example, 
at New Year' s, flood temples and shrines throughout Japan and 
put up traditional decorations at home, but feel no particular 
or enduring sense of loyalty to any specific parish, family 
temple, sect or cult. Typologically speaking, the client might 
be thought of as a somewhat secularized and erratic pilgrim. 
When he attends a religious festival, he plays the role of a 
guest--unlike an active member of the parish whose role is that 
of the devoted and conscientious host.t107 Since he is bound to 
shrines or temples neither by kinship nor by neighborhood ties, 
the tired questions about rights, duties and privileges which 
so preoccupied the members of religious cliques and parishes 
are naturally of little concern to him. Like the devotee of 
the New Religions, the object of his devotion is usually a 
deity with a specific ieligio-magical boon to offer. For ex­
ample, a young woman in Japan often consults mediums about her 
marriage prospects. She might even buy amulets that will help 
her find a husband. Let us suppose this amulet works. Her next 
trip to a shrine might be to purchase another amulet for safe 
childbirth. Later, when her husband buys a new Datsun, he might 
take it to Narita Fudosan tb have it blessed by the magic of 
the Shingon sect of Buddhism. When their son becomes a high 
school senior, he might take a trip to the shrine of Tenj in 
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(Sugawara Michizane) to pray for good luck on his college en­
trance examinations. All of these religious activities are 
specific, goal-oriented, ad hoc, this-worldly, and not neces­
sarily repeated. The growth of these floating (and fleeting) 
client-type relations seems closely related to the general 
atomization of modern Japanese cities. The phenomenon is also 
a response to the expansion of professional Shinto priesthoods 
which have tended to encourage the commercialism of festivals 
and have made possible the sale of amulets and blessings in the 
shrine throughout the whole week.t108 
The appearance of the client on such a large scale is 
obviously part o f  the privitization of religion in modern so­
ciety. While many o f  the client ' s  activities are therefore 
performed as an individual, he also acts as a member of a group 
on various occasions. This group, however, is not permanently 
tied to the object of devotion. One of the best illustrations 
of this, and of the client ' s  activities in general, is the 
recent, and somewhat macabre, boom in Sudden Death Temples 
(pokkuri-dera). The "specialty" of these temples is to ensure 
the client of a quick and easy death. The Sudden Death Temples 
have become quite popular since about 1960  among the aged, a 
minority group which feels particularly threatened and discrim­
inated against in modern Japan. In 1974, 9.t3% of Japant' s  
population was over 65 years of age. As the size of the average 
family decreased,t109 more and more o f  the elderly began to live 
apart from their children. Presently about 26 %  of them maintain 
a separate residence--few compared with Western countries, but a 
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great increase when compared with prewar Japan. This is a popu­
lation cohort which came to age when great stress was laid on 
the family and on respecting one's elders. The preference of 
the younger generation for maintaining separate homes natura�ly 
seems selfish to them. Spending their final years of life in 
a culture whose byword is "throw away after using" (tsukai 
sutete bunka), the elderly feel that they too have been used 
and cast aside. Because postwar legislation encourages the 
equal distribution of inheritances, in many families no one 
child has the material resources to take care of his parents. 
Many of these old people are therefore passed around from one 
child to the next (tarai-mawashi or babakorogashi as it is 
called)a- -which for the elderly is an exhausting and unsettling 
routine . According to statistics submitted to the World Health 
Organization in 1974, there were on the average 18 suicides by 
elderly Japanese every day. This is two more per day than in 
1971 when Japan already had the worl d ' s  second highest rate of 
110ld 1 . . d Under these circumstances it is little 
wonder that the aged turn to Amida Buddha and pray for a quick 
end to the sorrows of this life. 
e er y suici esa. 
Tours to the Sudden Death Temples are organized by Budd­
hist Ladies Associations, senior citizens clubs and travel 
agents. Only a few clients come by themselves. The tours 1r1-
elude stops at two or three such temples and an overnight stay 
in a temple inn. At the Kichidenj i temple in Nara, 111 a com­
plete pilgrimage consists of three separate visitationsa: the 
first to pray for long life and good health; the second for 
- 8 2 -
protection against accidents ; and the third for a quick and easy 
death (anraku ojo)e. Because old people often fear the embaras­
sing diseases of the lower parts (shimo no byo)e, they are asked 
to bring a special set of underwear with them to be blessed. 
Those who forget to bring underwear with them may purchase it at 
the temple itself. These garments are blessed by the priest 
who sprinkles them with holy water and utters a spell over them 
in the name of a toilet deity called Uzumasa. After this the 
priest gives a fifteen-minute sermonette in which he mixes 
comic entertainment with some o f  the sobering thoughts of tra­
ditional Buddhisme. He assures his audience that death is not 
something to be fearede, but is merely the falling of autumn 
leaves. With simple daily effort, one can be reborn in the 
Pure Land. We should therefore, smile, use gentle words, and 
keep our hearts pure. 
As a mode of religious affiliation , the Sudden Death Tour 
(pokkuri tsui) is obviously ad hoc and transient. No one gets 
to know the priest or his family, nor does the priest have time 
to talk personally with the thousands o f  people to whom he 
ministers each week. The relationship is, in fact, contractual : 
the underwear is blessed for a set fee (2000 yen in 1976). 
Looked at as a total event, only part of the "therapy" of the 
tour takes place in the temple itself. Back in their comfor­
table excursion buses, the old people have a chance to talk with 
each other about their health , differences with their children , 
and other problems of aging. The religious activities of modern 
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clients such as these pokkuri pilgrims therefore fulfill needs 
equally_ as specific, and serious, as those dealt with by the 
R 1 . . New e 1g1ons. 
1 1 2  
VI. Modernity and Religioust. Affiliations 
From de Coulanges, Durkheim, Weber, Parsons, Jaspers and 
Bellah, scholars who have helped set the comparative framework 
of this study, we have learned that the modernization of western 
society rests upon a chain of interrelated, epochal disjtunctions. 
We are told that the transition from traditional civilization to 
modernity was made possible by crucial differentiations which 
took place in the West throughout a long history beginning in 
ancient Israel, Greece and Rome, vizt. ,  the separation of the 
Creator God from His creation (religious transcendence), the 
separation of the religious community from ethnic and political 
groups (voluntarism), and the separation of individuals from 
their "ascriptive embeddedness" in primary groups (individua­
lism)t. Furthermore, it has been argued that our western tradi­
tions of ethical universalism, law and dialectical thought rest 
upon the same cultural, indeed religious, fissions. The ob­
verse side of these dissociations has been of equal importance, 
i. e .  the epochal enfranchisements which, having overcome the 
political and sacerdotal monopolies of the past, resulted in 
the tolerant denominationalism, ecumenism and pluralism of the 
modern age. 
It would be the height of cultural provincialism to in­
sist that all of these disjunctions be present before a society 
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is called modern .a113 In fact , to insist that all of the essen­
tial ingredients of Western cultural history are necessary for 
the emergence of modernity "in the true sense of the word" 
would be to commit the simple, but gross , logical error of post 
hoc ergo propter hoc . There are obviously many roads to mod­
ernity , many "modernizations" as it were . 
As we conclude this study of religious affiliations in 
Japan, we must return to the idea that the development of these 
affiliations can be used, in some sense , as an index of social 
change. What does the study of religious affiliations in Japan 
have to teach us about the modernization of Japanese society ? 
A .  Religious Enfranchisement or Demonopolization 
In Japan what resembles the evolution of western society 
most closely is the gradual extension of a religious and polit­
ical franchise which we have seen taking place throughout the 
history of the country: the l iberation of lower classes from 
the constraints of monopolistic cliques and the ideology of 
lineage , the development of voluntaristic confraternities based 
on faith , the expanding enclosures which gradually enfran­
chised not merely entire villages but the nation itself , the 
rise of individ·ual patterns of religious affiliation in the 
modern period and , finally , the guarantee of religious freedom 
after the war. The zealous "whosoever-will -may-come" spirit 
of the New Religions seems to be a counterpart to the volun­
tarism of Western religion. Personal relationships within these 
New Religionsa- -and the new Japan of which they are a part - - also 
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B. 
seem to be less rigidly particularistic than in the past. This 
trend towards ethical universalism is particularly evident in 
public school education.t114 
Religious Affiliations, Pluralism and Modernity 
In the West, one usually associates such processes of 
enfranchisement with the growth of tolerant, heterogeneous mass­
societies. Berger and Luckmann contend that pluralism itself 
"is the consequence of a historical process of demonopoliza-
tion. 111 1 5  Does this generalization apply to Japan? In spite 
of the prima facie similarities in the demonopolization of 
religious affiliations, when one considers their concomitant 
levels of cultural integration, the differences between Japanese 
and Western societies seem to be of greater significance. De­
monopolization by itself does not seem capable of transforming 
"the sacred canopy" of the past into the cultural toadstools 
of a pluralistic society. 
While semi-autonomous villages played a crucial role in 
Japanese history i� the Late Medieval Period, the city--the 
cradle of western pluralism- - is a comparatively recent develop­
ment. By the beginning of the Tokugawa period the only cities 
worth mentioning in Japan were Kyoto, Osaka, Sakai, Fushimi and 
Edo. Kamishima Jiro points out that while the Japanese city 
had its own distinctive ethos it did not develop into a genuine 
alternative to the way of life of the village� In the Meiji 
period, schools and company dormitories often housed young 
people from the same village, bringing to the city the village 
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spirit en bloc. People from the same province also gravitated 
towards each other. Tokyon, the Japanese city par excellence, 
was a place with few traditions or taboos of its own which 
could limit change or impair rapid modernization. Thus , the 
kind of transformation from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft alleged 
to characterize the history of western cities has not been as 
obvious in Japan. On the contrary , Kamishima argues the folk 
religion ,  gerontocracyn, familyismn, hierarchy and self-suffi­
ciency which characterized the traditional village are the 
marks of the Japanese city itself. The city is therefore, as 
he puts it , merely a "second village.n111 1 6  Tsurumi Kazuko re-
inforces this opinion when she writesn: "On the surface . • • 
contemporary Japanese society looks like a model mass society. 
At bottom , however , the primary village community and the fic­
titious village within the city are still preserved. 111 1 7  
Needless to sayn, such non-urbane cities limited the 
growth of pluralism in Japan. And yet the westerner will in-
. . · . ,,1 1 8h I Imo ern community must b 1 In the s1st t at d e p ura 1 1st1c. 
West , we expect a modern society to embrace a multiplicity of 
autonomous interests and orientations. In societies which are, 
at once, democratic , capitalist, and modern we expect these 
(often antagonistic) elements to confront one another freely 
in parliaments , the media , as well as in the market place. 
Writing in this veinn, David E. Apter holds that "to be modern 
means to see life as alternativesn, preferencesn, and choices. 
• • • Therefore, debate and discussion are characteristics of 
modernity. In  fact , to my mind, they are the critical and 
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minimal conditions of modernity. 11t1 1 9  
In Japan where the concept of the "public" (oyake) until 
modern times meant merely having a relationship with the court, 
and where public speech was unknown until Fukuzawa Yukichi 
introduced it in the Meiji period, public debate and discussion 
are recent phenomena. It is no wonder, then, that in classical 
Japanese literature the orator, who plays such a large role in 
d .  . . 120the literature of the West, is replaced by the 1ar1st. The 
concept of public mor�lity, or a morality tianscending the 
particularistic obligations of family and village, was intro­
duced only after the creation of public space--railroads, high­
ways, parks, etc.--in the Meiji period. As Edward Norbeck 
points out, "the idea of ' public morality' may be seen as an 
attempt to formulate conventions suitable to the enlarged social 
world of modern times.11t1 21 Without public space and public 
speech, the discussion of radical social and cultural alterna­
tives has been limited. As early as about 700 A. D. , the poet 
Kakinomotono-Hitomaro had pointed out "in our land covered with 
reed and rice-ears, they have not argued since the time of the 
gods.t" Even before this the so-called Seventeen Article Con­
stitution had made harmony, concord, and decorum the first 
principles of the state. This stress on harmony and consensus 
which has echoed and reechoed throughout Japanese history has 
clearly delayed the growth of a dialectical spirit. While de­
bates did occur between rival Buddhist monks, Buddhist logic 
(immyo) itself became a kind of dialogical etiquette--which, 
"accompanied by a certain gracious rhythm, 11t1 2 2  was transmitted 
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from master to disciple in secret. Logic was thereby transformed 
into ritual, ceremony and art. Debate may have been limited by 
the lack of any universally recognized law, scripture, or sense 
of religious transcendence (e.g. a Covenant) by which the right 
and wrong of things could be publicly adjudicated. 
Granting that debate and the opportunity to stage debate 
in public space have been limited in Japan, what kinds of cul­
tural, or religious "alternatives" have been available for 
"discussion"? The answer to this question at first seems ob­
vious: for millenia the Japanese have enjoyed a plethora of 
religious alternatives. We have seen however that these alter­
natives usually have been absorbed by the more demanding obli­
gations of primary groups, the village and the family. We 
have therefore treated these absorbed alternatives as examples 
of a "centripetal differentiation.n" As Hori Ichiro put it, 
"we find the same religious structures whether we look at .the 
nation, the family, ancestors or human relationsn: while there 
is a kind of differentiation made between gods and men, the 
sacred and the secular, there is not the absolute distinction 
one finds in monotheism.n111 2 3  Religious alternatives in Japan 
have generally led in a direction antithetical to the pluralism 
("centrifugal differentiation") which, in the West, one asso­
ciates with modernity. Only in the Shinshu, Nichiren (e.g. 
Fuju-Fuse) sects and in Christianity have the Japanese found 
potential alternatives to the cultural mainstream built of 
sturdier stuff. 
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the New Religions 
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seem to have established affiliations of a more "modern" sort. 
In the West,t· one commonly thinks of the "religious joiner" as 
an active, discerning, and choosing individual. We have seen 
that Berger and Luckmann envisage this individual strolling 
through the supermarket of suburban denominations, select ively 
(i.e. comparatively and rationally) making his purchases. We 
have discovered however that whatever its validity in the West, 
this supermarket model of religious recruitment is of limitedt• 
value in Japan. While many individuals change from one New 
t 1 24R 1 . · h , few seem to se 1ect. .·t eir · .re 1g1on 1 one 1g1on tott e  nex h 
the basis of any cool, comparat ive study. The individual, and 
his family, often drop out when the sect fails to bring about 
the kind of health, wealth, and happiness it promised to 
deliver. New religious affiliations are then established in a 
personal, but often haphazard way. While advertising and other 
impersonal forms of evangeliz ing are important ways of recruit­
ing, in some of the New Religions conversions are more often 
the result of the influence of relatives and friends. For 
these reasons, I have suggested that an "Avon or Pola model" of 
evangelization be used as a supplement to Ikado' s "Coca-Cola 
method.t111 2 5  Once the individual becomes a member, his time, 
energy and concentration tend to be completely mobilized by the 
group. The religious and magical ideas and practices of these 
religions--animism, shamanism and ancestor-worship--are not 
only pre-modern; they can be traced back to the most archaic 
strata of Japanese religious history. The values they teach and 
exemplify are also those of pre-modern Japan : harmony, coopera-
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tion, selflessness, thankfulness, and a fastidious sense of 
obligation and hierarchy. The themes of non-dualism, the unity 
of man , god and nature, the oneness of the emperor and his 
people, and the special mission of the Japanese race taught, 
mutatis mutandis, by most of these religions are clear survivals 
of the civil religious sentiments of the prewar period. Such 
ideas are compatible with democracy only when one identifies 
democracy--as the Japanese tend to do-- with a political and 
spiritual consensus. Thus the New Religions give greater scope 
to the activities of individuals without in any way fostering 
individualism. While there are hundreds of such religious 
groups to choose from, the particularistic loyalties they gene­
rate result merely in a pluralism of memberships and external 
doctrines. The growth of any deeply rooted pluralism in thought, 
feeling or values is quickly stifled by a dominant internal 
ethos redolent of the gross national custom of Japan before 
1 945. 126 
Movements such as the New Religions which worship univer­
sal (or even monotheistic deities) have tended to develop more 
open or voluntaristic patterns of affiliation. Nevertheless, 
salvation religions--such as Amidism, which transcend not only 
the village but Japan itself--have generally been domesticated 
by the needs of ancestor worship. They have also been trans­
formed into less than ultimate concerns by the interests of the 
local communities which absorbed the confraternities and sects 
bearing the Good News. We have also seen how these movements 
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were coopted and subdued by the government itself . The solid­
arity between religious affiliations and primary institutions 
which reslted from all of this may have helped to delay any 
radical differaentiation between social reality and cultural 
ideals .  The kind of "axial breakthrough" witnessed in other 
civilizations therefore seems to have been repeatedly postponed 
. 12 7in Japan. Needless to say , the government itself played a 
major role in maintaining this state of affairs. In the 
chauvanistic atmosphere of prewar Japan, official government 
scholars such as Inoue Tetsujiro could seriously maintain that 
Japan had fulfilled the Hegelian dreama: the Real had become 
. 1 2 8the Ideal , the Ideal the Real . Japan ' s  "immanental theo -
cracy" was therefore erected upon a belabored identification 
of the sacred and the social. Actually, the government ' s  ideal 
of the unity of religion and government (saisei-itchi) was a 
scheme to "dedifferentiate" a society that was becom1ng in­
creasingly complexa- -and criticala. Nevertheless,  the official 
civil theology resonated deeply with the kind of saisei-itchi 
that we have discovered in the micropolitics of the Japanese 
villagea. Civil theology , poured our "from above" and fermented 
in the religious and political vessels of folk custom,  produced 
the heady brew of prewar civil religion .  This climate of 
opinion quite naturally included important elements of religious 
nativism (kokugaku) and anti-modernism (kindai no chokoku) 
which, like romantic nationalism and radical socialism in the 
West , aimed at "a more tightly integrateda, less differentiated , 
. · t · . . 111 2 9d . 1 The demonopolization and 1ess .in ivi ua is ic socie  d ty .  
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of religious affiliations finally turned out to be a symptom of 
mass mobilization rather than an index of growing pluralism. 
The cost of this cultural atavism both in war and human exploi­
tation is too well known to be recounted. 
The kinds of disjunctions which allegedly have character­
ized the rise of the modern West--religious transcendence, 
individualism, a dialectical spirit, the concept of the public, 
and even pluralism itself--must be treated as secondary char­
acteristics of the modernization process. As such they color 
and shape, but do not determine the level or  degree of modern­
ity. There are, after all, as many ways for a society to be 
modern as there are for it to be traditional. We have seen in 
this paper that in their religious life, the Japanese have 
freed themselves from the fetters of tribe, clique and local 
community to a remarkable degree. Yet, these fetters have often 
been reforged as the rivets of human relations in an industrial 
societyt. In the West, liberation from "the constraining condi­
tions of tribe, ethnic affiliation, particularistic privileges, 
and the mediation of religious organizationst11 1 3 0  has been 
called by some secularization, by others modernization, and by 
still others- -looking at things from an entirely different 
perspective--salvation-history. What one calls the similar, 
if not so radical, movements in Japanese history depends on 
how one reads history, and on what the Japanese themselves do 
with the possibilities that history discloses. 
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1 .  While this paper rests upon theoretical concepts taken from 
Western sociology,  the threefold typology which I shall 
develop is similar to those suggested by a number of Japan­
ese scholarsa. Hagiwara Tatsuo in "Kinsei saishidan seiritsu 
j osetsu ," Nihon bunka kenkyuj o kiyo (Kokugakuin Daigaku) , · 
1 9 5 9 ,  No. 4, pp . 22-26 puts forward a scheme which , begin­
ning with the u�ibito or clansmen (roughly the ancient 
period) , goes tarough a (medieval) miyaza stage, and cul­
minates in the (modern) uj iko. Closer to my own typology
(because they go beyond the uj iko) are the suggestions of
Wakamori Taro , Morioka Kiyom 1 ,  and Chiba Masaji. Wakamori
divides religious affiliations in Japan into those based on
kinship (an�ien!)a, territory (feudal)a, and faith (modern) .
( See "Shinko shudan ," Nihon minzokutaku taikei , Vol . III , Shakai to minzokua. Tokyoa: Heibons a ,  1962 , pp. 2 5 9 - 2 8 8  . )  
Morioka in Reli ion in Changing Japanese Societ (Tokyoa:
University o o yo res s ,  , p. points out that 
the Shinto shrines "first came into existence to enshrine 
the guardian deity of a clan (ichimon no uj igami) and that 
s ubsequently , with the collapse of the clan system and the 
participation of people who had been outsidersa, the 
guardian deity became the tutelary deity of an area . . . .  
At the present time , howeve.r , due to the urbanization of 
society , the guardian deities of local areas are in the 
process of becoming delocalized and their shrines too are
drawing worshipers from increasingly extensive areas." 
My own research also would support Chiba ' s  tripartition : 
miyaza , ujiko and sukeisha (the latter roughly correspond­
ing to my ' clients" and "devotees") . Chiba ,  however , 
hesitates to call _this development "historical" since some
regions such as Tohoku have never had miyaza while others 
have preserved the institution to the present day . I have 
sought to avoid this impasse by defining my typological 
stages more br9adly . See his Matsuri no hoshakaigaku. 
Tokyo :  Kobundo , 1 9 7 0 ,  p. 93 .  Others , _ such as Higo Kazuo, 
Harada Toshiaki , Ariga Kizaemon and Ito Mikiharu are even 
more strongly opposed to this developmental approach either 
because they confuse it with nineteenth century evolution­
ism or because they prefer the a�istorical approach of 
structural anthropology . See Ito Mikiharu ,  � ' Uj iko� no
shakaij inruigaku josetsu , "  Nihon bunka kenkyuj o kiyo , 1 9 7 0 ,
No. 2 5 ,  pp . 1 - 2 9.  
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Yoshida) , territorial shrines (Kamo, Inari, Gion), and 
shrines supported by clients (Iwashimizu, Kitano). Harada 
Toshiakt, Jinj a: minzokugaku no tachiba kara miru. Tokyo : 
Shibundo, 1961, pp. 93 -94 . While these three types of 
affiliation continue to coexist to this day, one should 
not overlook the s till more significant changes in their 
relative strengths and weaknesses in Japanese society. 
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discussed in this paper are primarily organizations of 
the sects. 
34. Harada Toshiaki, Shukyo to shakai. Tokyo: Tokai Daigaku
Shuppankai, 1974, pp. 229-231. 
35. Takatori Masao and Has�i�oto Mineo, §hukyo izen. Tokyo:
(NHK Bukku�u), Nihon Hoso Shuppan Kyokai, 1971 , pp. 1 29-130. 
36. This chart is a summary and modification of Hori, Folk 
Religion. . .  , pp. 3 2-81. 
37. During the Heian period thete of the Nara court became 
known as koe or simply as ko� 
38. Sakurai Tokutaro, Nihon minkan shinkoron. Tokyot: Kobundo,
1970, pp. 1 93-196. 
39. Sakurai Tokutaro, Ko shudan seiritsu katei no kenkyu.
Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1962 , pp. 554-579. 
40. Hori, Folk Religion . . .  , p. 36. 
41. Waida Manabu, "Symbolism of ' Descentt' in Tibetan Sacred 
Kingship and some East Asian Parallels," Numen, Vol. XX,
Fasc. 1 (April 1973), pp. 60-78. 
42 .  Hori, Folk Religion . . .  , p. 69. 
43. See above, pp. 19-20. 
44. Sakurai, Nihon minkan . . .  , p. 1 96. 
45. Robert N. Bellah, Tokugawa Religion: The Values of Pre­
Industrial Japan. Boston: Beacon, 1957 , pp. 107- 177 . 
46. After their abolition by Oda Nobunaga, guilds were tole­
rated again only after the seclusion edicts were proclaimed
and domestic trade began to flourish in the seventeenth 
century. By the middle of the nineteenth century the 
guilds had gained nearly complete control over wide areas 
of the economy, fixing prices at exorbitant levels, and 
preventing new businesses and shops from opening. In re­
sponse to the hue and cry raised against these abuses,
in 1841-1842 the government once again abolished these in-
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47. 
48. 
49. 
SO. 
51. 
5 2. 
53. 
54. 
stitutions. After a brief revival, they finally succumbed 
to the open competition of the Meiji period. Thus the 
commercial and economic za had a fate similar to the 
socio-religious monopolies we d.iscussed above. Neither 
was able to survive in the Modern period. 
Smith, The Agrarian Origins . . .  ; p. 148. 
Kasahara Kazuo, Chusei ni okeru Shinshu no keisei. 
Tokyon: Shinjninbutsu Oraisha, 1971, pp. 
Hagiwara, Chusei saishi . . .  , p. 1 69. 
-
Toyoda Takeshi, "Chusei ni okeru jinja no saishi soshiki 
ni tsuite,n" Shigaku zasshi (1942) , _Vol. �3, No. 11, p. 1 3 7 �. 
Fo� a general description of the so orn� see Fuk�dan_nEijiro, 
"Soson no hatten," Nihon rekishi lcoza. Tokyo : Tokyo
Daigaku Shuppankai, 1957 , III, pp. 69-7 5 ,  and Hagiwara,
Chusei saishi. . .  , Ch. 4,  "Soson no hatten to saishi soshiki,n" 
pp. 167-277 and Ch. 7, "Goson saishi soshiki no kansei," 
pp. 413-454. 
Smith, The Agrarian Origins . . .  , p. 188. 
Such subdivisions of the miyaza were one way of adjusting 
to the clamor of the up�and-coming classes to be admitted 
to the guilds. For_nthis history of the guild in Ima�ori-go 
see Nakamura Ken, "Omi no kuni Tokuchin-ho Imabori-go no 
'so' oboeg�ki," Shakai kagaku (Doshisha Daigaku Jinbunka­
gaku Kenkyuj o) , January 1970, 11, Vol. I I I n1 No. 4 z  pp. 110-
160 and "Omi no kuni Tokuchin-ho Imabori-go kenkyu no seika 
to kadai," Shakai kagaku (March 1976) ,  20, Vol. VI, No. 2, 
pp. 88 - 210. 
Murata Sokichi, Hiyoshi jinjna shiki, 1970 (unpublished). 
When I visited this village in 1976, I found that while 
the privileges of the miyaza had been greatly restricted, 
the affairs of the parish are still in the hands of an 
Upper Guild of eight men (holding office for eight years)n, 
a Lower Guild of about fifty hou�ehold heads , a lay-priest
(kannushi) and an oblationer (shoshl). Modern scholarship
has shown that the much venerated "charter" granted to 
Botaro was actually a fake drawn up by merchants in the 
area to legitimate their own monopolistic schemes. This 
charter-amulet is an excellent example of the reflection 
of micropolitics and microeconomics in the religious sym­
bols o f  the communityn' s  festival faith. 
For the influence of this crop on the Kinai see William B. 
Hauser, "The Diffusion of Cotton Processing and Trade in 
the Kinai Region in Tokugawa Japan,n" Journal of Asian 
Studies, XXXI I I, No. 4 (August 1974) , ppn. 633-649. 
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55. This chart is a translation of one prepared by Tak�da_ 
Choshu, "Kinsei sonraku no miyaza to ko," Nihon shukyoshi 
koza, Vol. III, Shukyo to minshu seikatsu, ed. Ienaga 
Saburo, et al. Tokyot: Sant'tichi Shobo, p. 176. The 
original data were assembled by Imai Rintaro an� Yagi 
Akihiro, Hoken shakai no noson kozo. Tokyo : Yuhikaku,
1955, pp. 207-233. 
56. Among these 24 families were 5 genin iemochi families who 
were actually being treated as yakunin by this time. 
57. Ando Seiich!, Kinsei miyaza no shiteki kenkyu. Tokyo:
Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1960 , pp. 105-106. 
58. The word ujiko ("children of the clan") seems to indicate 
subordination to the uj ibito and can therefore be compared 
with such wor�s as yamago, tago, funago, nago, etc. 
(Wakamori, Chusei kyodotai . . .  , p. 100.) While some early
documents use the word ujiko to refer to the woman of the 
clan, by the mid-fifteenth century it was being used for 
both sexes. (Hagiwara, Chusei saishi . . .  , pp. 320-321. ) 
59. Toyoda, "Chusei ni okeru jinja . . .  , "  p. 1354. 
60. Hagiwara, Chusei saishi . . .  , pp. 314-333, 427-431. 
61 . Yanagi ta, "Uj igam! . . .  , " p. 403; Higo Kazuo, "Uj iko soshiki,"
Minzokugaku kenkyu (1946), N. s. , Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 2 3-40; 
Ariga Kizaemon, "Senzo to ujigami,t" Minzokugaku kenkyu 
(December 1967) , Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 175-184. 
62. Naoe Hiroj i, "A Study of Yashiki-gami, the Deity of House 
and Grounds,t" in Richard M. Dorson, ed., Studies in 
Japanese Folklore. Bloomington : Indiana University 
Press, 1963 , pp. 198-2 14. 
63.  Yanagita Kunio divided the uj igami into three types. In 
order of their historical development they are: 1) the 
deity of the ancient linked households (ichimon-uj igama) , 
2) that of the later household and its property Crashiki­
u�igami),  and 3) that of the village (mura-ujigam1). Al­
ttough the ujigami that one thinks of today is primarily 
the tutelary deity of villages (i.e. a territorial god) , 
the fact that today in some areas the uj igami is called 
the uchigami (or household deity) shows that the cults of 
family and village have not always been as distinct as one 
might imagine. Further evidence for this comes from the 
Kanto Plain, Ibaraki, Chiba, Tochigi, Tohoku and Kyushu-­
places distant from the old capital- -where household 
deities were often called ujigami, ubusuna-sama, or chinju­
�' terms generally associated with territorial, and not 
fimfly, gods. Yanagita points out that household deities 
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were often amalgamated as community gods. This metamor­
phosis was not unnatural since the cults of lineage deities 
in ancient Japan were probably quite similar to one another. 
The places where they were worshiped were close together 
so that one clan would know how similar its rites were to 
those of its neighbors. Furthermore, there were few 
shrine buildings in those days to impede such mergers.
Mergers might also have been a way of sharing the pleasures, 
the expenses, and the inconveniences of the abstinences and 
taboos which were part of the worship of the kami. Finally,
Yanagita speculates, these mergers were made possible by a 
change in the concept of deity. Villagers simply forgot 
that their gods had once been their ancestors. This lapsus
memoriae weakened the particularistic bonds between family
and god and allowed the deity to be merged with those of 
other kinship groups as a new community deity, or_ uji
�
ami. 
Yanagita, "Ujigami . . n. ," ppn. 405- 407 . )  Hori Ichiro, w o 
criticized his father-in-lawn' s  theory of the lapsus memoriae, 
stressed not the integration of family cults in the forma­
tion of the ujigami faith, but the process leading "from 
the undifferentiated, vague concept of spirits to the gradual 
articulation and clarification of such deification . . . .  " As 
a result of migrations, invasions and missionary activities,
deities bearing the name of specific family groups became 
widespread. "Thus, the original vague, local, spiritual
concept (of deity) became differentiated and individualized.n" 
Folk Religion . . .  , p. 58. 
64. Takeda Choshu, "Kinsei shakai to bukkyo," Asao Naohiro, 
et al. eds., Nihon rekishi, Vol. 9, Kinsei 1 .  Tokyo : 
Iwanami Shoten, 1975 , pp. 264-302n. See also the same 
author ' s  Sosen suhai. Kyoto : Heirakuji Shoten, 1972, 
pp. 173-185. 
65. Yoshimuro Keijo , ed. , Nihon bukkyoshi. Kyoto : Hozokan, 
1969, Vol. III  (Kinsei-Kindaihen), pp. 220-224. 
66. According to a survey conducted in 1932, about 85 % of 
Japan ' s  outcast population, the eta or mikaiho burakumin 
are members of the Pure Land sect. In one part of Okayama 
Prefecture there were some Shingon and Nichiren burakumin ; 
in Shizuoka and to the east there were also some who had 
joined the Nichiren, Rinzai, Soto, Ji, and Shingi Shingon 
sects. The Pure Land sects offered these pariahs cargo­
cult visions of paradise commonly found among the religions
of the oppre�sed. Since many of their priests were already
married (kebozu) , it was only natural for them to be af­
filiated with a sect with married clergy. The government 
also pressured t�e burakumin to join the sect. (Yoshimura,
ed., Nihon bukkyoshi, Vol. III,  pp. 216-217.)  
In  spite of the popular following enjoyed by Honen, Shinran,
and other Pure Land leaders, the movement also appealed to 
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the upper classesa. The Chinzei branch founded by Shokobo 
Bencho was patronized by warriors and landlords. Likewise,
the Seizan branch founded by Zennebo Shoku was supported by 
the aristocracya. During its period of greatest popularity 
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Ippen ' s  Ji sect
lost many of its peasant believers because of its conserva­
tive stand in the rural uprisings of that period. While
peasants were deserti�g the sect for the more congenial
atmosphere of the Ikko (Pure Land) sect, the Ji sect was
further weakened by the defection of many warrior families
to Zen temples. 
The class influence upon the Zen sects is also of interest. 
While the warriors were clearly the pillars of Zen during 
the Ashikaga and Tokugawa periods, the sect' s appeal became 
, quite general a� c�n be j udged by the appearance of such 
figures as Ikkyu Soj un _ (!394-1481), Bankei (1622 -1692 ) and
Hakuin (1685- 1768)a. Soto Zen, especially after it was re­
fashioned by Keizan Jokin (1268-1325 ) ,  had a clear appeal 
for the massesa. Rinzai, however, was associated with the 
official Gozan Temples and failed to enlist the support of 
the common people. In general, the more these sects per­
mitted "mixed practices," the greater was their popular 
appe�a. The more they insisted on a "single practice"a- -- . 
and the more they were influenced by China and Chinese 
monks- -the more limited was their following among the masses . 
6 7 .  Suzuki Eitar o ,  in Suzuki Eitaro chosakushu (Tokyo: Mirai­
sha, 1968, Vola. I, Nihon noson shakaigaku genri, Part I, 
pp.  3 3 5 - 340),  points out that it is a rare community where 
ujiko and danka completely overlapa. 
68. Yanagita, "Ujigami . . .  ," p .  439. 
69. Ando Seiichi, "Waga kokyo no kako !o shorai ,"  Kumano bunka 
(Nachi Taisha : Kumano Bunka Kenkyukai), August 1975 , No. 1, 
pp . 18-19 .  
7 0 .  Yanagita, "Uj igami . . .  ," p .  430 .  
71a. Sight- seeing groups in modern Japan have nearly the same 
social and economic structure as the pre-modern confratern­
ity. Sakurai, Ko shudan . . .  , pp. 4 -6a. 
72 . Sakurai, Nihon minkan . . .  , p .  199. 
7 3 .  Ibid . ,  pp . 168 - 1 72 .  
74 . See footnote 81 below for another example of the involvement
of such ko in village politics. 
-
75 .  Kasahara Kazuo, Chusei ni okeru . . .  , passim . 
- -
7 7 .  
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76 . .  This seems to be a striking contrast to sects and confra­
ternities in the Christian West where one usually associates 
faith with voluntarismn, at least in the first generation of 
a movement. For this reason it would be hazardous to think 
of even the Pure Land ko as embodying the same kind of 
voluntarism (i.e. individually determined commitments) we 
find in, say, the early Free Churches of the Protestant 
Reformation. On the other hand, the differences between 
the two situations is not as great as one might imagine, 
especially when contemporary religious institutions are 
compared. In the case of the modern denomination, the 
spiritual heirs of the Free Churches, affiliations are 
clearly based on heredity and are influenced, to some ex­
tent, by social class and status. One must therefore be 
careful not to compare the ideal of voluntary religious 
commitments in the (Protestant) West with the fact of in­
herited affiliations in Japann. This is especially impor­
tant since religious commitment has become a major paradigm 
for rational, purposeful--and "modern"--activity in the 
Weberian school. See below, p. 68 ff. 
Ikeda Yoshisuken1 "Ko_nshudan no shakaiteki seikakun' " 
Tetsugaku kenkyu (Kyoto Daigaku) , October 19 57, Vol. XXXIX ,  
Non. 7 , pp. 15 -3 5. 
-
78. Suzuki Eitaro, Suzuki . . .  , pp . 347-3 4 9. 
79. Takeda Choshu, "Kinsei sonraku no miyaza to ko,n" p. 144. 
8 0. Sakurai, Ko shudan . . n. , p .  7 .  
81n. The history of the I zu Shrine in Katada (Omi), not far 
from Imabori-go, is a good example of the involvement of 
the miyaza and ko in the micropolitics of the semi-auton­
omous villages "'(go) of this area. I n  the fourteenth cen­
tury a clique ofwealthy provincial families (<logo) had 
wrested control of the_nvillage and its economy--especially 
transport--from the shoen officials and had assumed the _ 
leadership of the local parish guild called the tonobarashu. 
Opposed �o thi� guild was the mataudo class made up of 
lower-class myoshu. While the mataudo (who themselves were 
the overlords of several subordinate classes) were not 
allowed to participate in the activities of the guild, they 
were far from being disorganized. After converting to Pure 
Land Buddhism, they formed a nembutsu-kon. This gave them 
a strgnger social bond, one_nwhich contrasted vividly with 
the dozoku-based tonobarashu. As the economy and society
of the go continued to develop, the kinship tiesn_of the doge 
class were weakenedn. Around 1400  the tonobarashu was drawn 
into a confraternity affiliated with Daitokuji. This added 
to their arsenal a more potent, non-fictive ideological 
weapon for the control of the area. Class distinctions now 
- 103-
had clear Buddhist labels:  the Zenists (the village Estab­
lishment) versus the Amidists (subordinate classes and 
client families)a. Gradually , however, the fortunes of the
mataudo began to improve so that in terms of wealth and 
power they became virtually indistinguishable fro� their 
rivals.  Later on, provincial samurai families (foshi)
gained control of the local economy and filled t e offices 
of the parish guild in order to protect their interestsa. 
The complex history of the guild and confraternities of 
Katada came to an end only in the Meij i period with thea· 
fall of these samurai families . See Mori Ryukichi, "Miyaza 
no shocho O me guru kankyu to j oken, 11 Nihonshi kenky.u
(October 1954),  XXII, pp . 10-21 .  
82. Iwamoto Tokuichi, "Shinto Ceremonies Connected with the 
Entry of Foreigners,a" Proceedings of the IXth International 
Con ress for the History of Religions (Tokyo: Maruzen , 
5196 ), pp . 315-319. 
83. Alex Inkeles and David H .  Smith, Becoming Modern : Indi­
vidual Change in Six Developing Countries. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press , 1974, p .  7. 
84 . Morioka, Religion . . .  , pp. 155 -167 .  
85 .  Chiba, Matsuri . . a. , p. 81.  
86. Yanagita, "Uj igami . . .  , "  p .  398 . 
·87 . Morioka, Religion . . .  , pp. 39- 7 2. For an account of similar 
pressures on the miyaza itself in the Modern Period see
l\Tinston Davis, "The Miyaza and the Fisherman: Ritual
Status in Coastal Villages of Wakayama Prefecture," Asian 
Folklore Studies, Vol. 3 6, No. 2, pp . 1- 29, 1977. 
88 .  Ikado Fuj io, Kamigoroshi no j idai . Tokyo: Nihon Keizai 
Shinbunsha, 1973, p. 182. 
89. Sakurai , Nihon minkan . . .  , p .  197a. Rennyo has made the same 
complaint in the fifteenth century . 
90 . Suzuki Eitaro, Suzuki. . . , pp . 340-349. -·--
-
91. Sumiya Mikio, "Kokuminteki bijon no_togo !o bunkai," in Ito
Sei, et al.  eds . a, Kindei Nihon shisoshi koza. Tokyo:
Chikuma Shobe, 1972, Vol. V, pp . 37-39. 
92.  Kitagawa, Religion in Japanese History , p .  267 .  
93. Cf.  Daniel C .  Haltom, The National Faith of Japan . New
York: E .  P .  Dutton, 1938, and Modern Japan and Shinto 
Nationalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943 .  
, 
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94. 
9 5 .  
96. 
97. 
98. 
9 9 .  
100. 
101. 
102. 
103. 
104t. 
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Tsurumi Shunsuke, Nichijtoteki shiso no kanosei. Tokyot: 
Chikuma Shobe, 1967, pp . 34-38. 
See R. P. Dore, City Life in Japan : A Study of a Tok�
o Ward. 
Berkeleyt: University of California Press, 1958 , p. 3 2 and 
324. 
Murayama Tomoyoshi,t_tByakuya in Murayama Tomoyoshi-shu, Gendai 
Nihon Bungaku Zenshu. Tokyot: Chikuma Shobo, 1957 , pp. 345t-
347, cited in Tsurumi Kazuko, Social Change and the Individual: 
Japan Before and After Defeat In World War II. Princeton :  
Princeton University Press, 1970 , p. 59 . 
Maruyama Masao, Nihon no shiso . Tokyo : Iwanami Shoten, 1970, -
p. 46. 
Irokawa Daikichi, "Japan ' s  Grass-Roots Tradition : Current 
Issues in the Mirror of History,t" Japan Quarterly, Volt. XX,
No. 1 (January-March 1973) ,  p. 83 . See also the same 
authort' s  Meiji no bunka. Tokyot: Iwanami Shoten, 1970, 
Chapter VITI, Pt. 4, "Maruyama ' kokutai'-ron no kento,t" 
pp . 287-301. 
The solar calendar, and the sense of time that went with it,
were the concerns of the bureaucrat, the school master and 
the industrialist. By law, calendars had to be printed with 
the dates of the Gregorian system in large figures, with 
small letters marking the dates of the lunar calendar. 
Farmers, however, consistently followed the small figures. 
These small numbers also stood for a "qualitative" sense of 
time, since some days were lucky, others unlucky. The in­
troduction of the Gregorian calendar and the new series of 
national festivals (based on the rituals of the imperial 
household and its solar ancestors) were all part of what 
broadly may be characterized as an only partially successful 
attempt to nationalize and "solarize" the lunar community of 
the folk. 
See below, pp. 67-73 .  
R. P. Dore and Ouchi Tsutomu, "Rural Origins of Japanese 
Fascism," in James W .  Morley, ed., Dilemmas of Growth in 
Prewar Japan. Princetont: Princeton University Press, 1971, 
p. 198. 
Chiba, Matsuri . . .  , pp. 303- 308. 
Murakami Shigeyoshi, Nihon hyakunen no shukyo. Tokyo : 
Kodnsha, 1968, p. 22. 
Ikado Fujio, "Trend and Problems in New Religions: Religion
in Urban Society," in Morioka Kiyomi and l'lill iam H .  Newel 1, 
eds., The Sociology of Japanese Religion. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1968, pp . 103-106. 
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1 05. Ibid . , p .  110 .  
106 .  For a development of the "supermarket model" of religious
recruiting see Peter L .  Berger and Thomas Luckmann, "Secu­
larization and Pluralism,a" International Yearbook for the 
Sociology of Religion ( 1966), Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 73-84a. 
The average member of these religions often knows surpris­
ingly little about other New Religions, or about the his­
torical ties between his own group and the others. Which 
one he finally j oins is due largely to happenstance and to 
the_in!luence of �dvertisementsai !amily_and !riends. S�e
Goto Yobun, "S kyodan Morioka doj o sobyoa: nyushin no shuhen 
o chushin �i,� Shukyogaku nenpo ( 1975), No. 20 (Taisho 
Daigaku Shukyo Gakkai) ,  pp . 35-43. 
1 07. Chiba, Matsuri . . .  , p. 84. 
108. Wakamori, Chusei . . .  , p. 147. 
109 .  Between 1960 and 1974 alone the members per household in 
Japan dropped from 4.54 to 3.44. In the same period, in 
spite of a total increase in the population, households
with 10 or more members (to take the extreme case) declined 
from 365,689 to 33,300. Those with 7 members decreased
from 1,663,3 0 2  to 874, 000. Ja
!
an Statistical Yearbook 
(Japan Statistical Associationa. Tokyo :  Mainichi News­
papers, 1976, pp . 28- 29. 
1 1 0 .  Japan Times, December 5, 1976, p. 14. 
1 11 .  While its history can be traced back hundreds of years, this
temple has been a pokkuri-dera since the middle of the
Tokugawa period. At that time it was patronized by people 
in the entertainment world .  It is said that in those days
the sidewalks of the temple never had to be swept because
the skirts of courtesans, geisha and other fair ladies
going to and from the temple kept them perpetually cleana. 
These clients of the temple seem to have had two things in 
common with the elderly clients who come to Kichidenj i 
today : 1)  they were cut off from normal family ties and 
therefore hoped for a quick end to life when they grew old 
and could no longer care for themselves, and 2) they were , 
for different reasons, afraid of the "diseases of the lower 
parts . "  From the beginning, the temple had no sectarian 
identity, though it was forced into the Pure Land sect by 
the Tokugawa governmenta. It still has no danka and per­
forms no funerals. 
112a. N�ganuma !wane, "Pokkuri-dera o yogiru oi to shi,a" Asahi
Janaru (December 19, 1975) ,  Vol. 17 , No . 54, pp. 86-91. 
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113. What is more, not all scholars would agree on the importance 
to be assigned to each of these disjeunctions in the making 
of the modern West. For example, the emphasis on religious 
transcendence in the writings of Weber, Parsons and Bellah 
is often completely overlooked or disregarded by other 
students of modernization. Robert Bellah's various essays 
on Japan have stressed the countrye' s  "submerged tradition 
of transcendence" as  a reason for her failure to develop 
wholesome, democratic institutions. See Beyond Belief, 
p. 118. For this reason, and because of the particularism 
of her value-system, Bellah finds much in common between 
the fundamental social structures of Japan and pre-modern 
societies. "The type of fusion of culture, society and 
perseonality which seems to be present in Japan is a nor1nal 
feature of primitive and archaic cultures. It was found 
quite generally in the bronze age monarchies which existed 
throughout the civilized world until the first millenium 
B.C. At that time, however, a series of social and cultural 
revolutions broke up the archaic fusion and ushered in ae . 
new type of society which I have called elsewhere the his­
toric type.e" "Japane' s  Cultur�l Identitye: Some Reflections 
on the \'lark of Watsuj i Tetsuro,e" Journal of Asian Studies, 
XXIV, No. 4 (August 1965), p. 592. Although some have 
taken this statement to imply that Japan is still in a 
moral Bronze Age, clearly this is not what was intended� 
What Professor Bellah, in effect, is suggesting is that, 
with the exception of a few int·ellectual and spiritual 
geniuses, the Japanese have not experienced the kind of 
cultural cleavages described by Jaspers and others as "axial 
breakthroughs . "  See page 8 above. Only in a few cases has 
Japan attained the critical reflexivity which enabled men 
in other civilizations to transcend the givenness of their 
own social and cultural assumptions. One senses that for 
Bellah, the danger of Japan's cultural heritage lies not 
in a Bronze Age relapse, but in the social and political 
consequences entailed by the failure to develop and sustain 
a dialectical imagination. In short, he is concerned here, 
as he is in his studies of American culture, with the 
nemesis of s elf-idolization. 
114. Edward Norbeck, Religion and Society in Modern Japane: 
Continuity and Change. Houstone: Tourmaline, 1970, p. 129. 
115. Berger and Luckmann, "Secularization and Pluralism , "  p. 73. 
116. Kamishima Jiro, Kindai Nihon no seishin kozo. Tokyoe: 
Iwanami Shoten, 1971, pp. 40 -89. 
117. Social Change and the Individual ... , p. 211. 
118. Talcott Parsons, "Belief, Unbelief, and Disbelief,e" in 
Rocco Caporale and Antonio Grumellie, eds., The Culture of 
China, Tibet, Jap_an�.-""VT"o__no--sr �a-s�t--,.,.,..-es�t:-,...-e-n�t-e-r----. �r-e__s-s, -..-..,,_..,..+, u-..--:u -,i; 
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Unbelief. Berkeley : University of Californi·a Press ,  1971, 
p. 238. 
119. The Politics of Modernization. Chicago and Londona: Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, 1969, p. 10. As we have learned from
Jaspers (page 8 above ), "debate" has been a characteristic
of self-critical, "pluralistic" societies since the first
millenium B . C. 
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